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HOW "NECESSARY" BECAME THE MOTHER OF
REJECTION: AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT THE
FATE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY
OF BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 1113
Christopher D. Cameron*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Nearly a decade has passed since organized labor successfully lobbied Congress for what have turned out to be the

most sweeping changes in the law governing private-sector

collective bargaining since the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.1 The
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984,2 codified in relevant part at section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, was passed to accomplish two goals: (1) halt
unilateral changes by employers in the collectively bargained

terms and conditions of employment during reorganization

proceedings; 3 and (2) reduce the perceived tendency of bank© 1993 Christopher D. Cameron. Any opinions expressed in this article are the
author's alone.
* Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern University. B.A. 1980, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. 1983, Harvard University.
Support for this article was provided by generous grants from the Fund for
Labor Relations Studies and the Trustees of Southwestern University. Research assistance was provided by Laura Kerschenbaum (class of 1994) and Corey Robins (class of 1994). I am indebted to Kevin Johnson and Michael
Echevarria for their helpful comments and to Judy Sloan for her encouragement. I also thank my former colleagues at Taylor, Roth, Bush & Geffner, who
trained a sometimes reluctant student in the nuances of bankruptcy and labor
law.
1. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Ch. 120, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) codified as amended at 29 U.S.C §§ 141-187 (1993) [hereinafter
Taft-Hartley Act]. Although Congress enacted several labor law reforms after
1947, until 1984 none of them substantially altered the basic presumption that
the federal government should supervise the process, but not the product, of
collective bargaining. See infra notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
2. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1113 (1988) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
3. See THOMAS R. HAGGARD & MARK S. PULLIAM, CONFLICTS BETWEEN LABOR LEGISLATION AND BANKRuPTcy LAW 69 & n.53 (1987).
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ruptcy judges to approve rejection of collective bargaining
agreements without due regard for national labor policy. 4
This article presents the first empirical analysis of the
most basic of questions about the statute: is section 1113
working?
During the late 1970's and early 1980's, labor leaders
watched anxiously as bankruptcy judges and district courts
approved the rejection of collective bargaining agreements
with some of the nation's biggest employers in key unionized
industries, including air passenger service, 5 food packaging
and processing,6 interstate ground transportation,7 steel,8
and others.9 Then in 1984, the Supreme Court decided a case
that seemed to confirm labor's worst fears. NLRB v. Bildisco
& Bildisco' ° held that collective bargaining agreements were
executory contracts capable of being rejected under the Bankruptcy Code, 1 and more importantly, the unilateral act of rejection prior to bankruptcy court approval did not itself constitute a violation of the duty to bargain ordinarily imposed
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1 2 Bildisco effectively pre-empted labor's remedies under the NLRA
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines, 38 B.R. 67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984);
In re Braniff Airlines, Inc., 25 B.R. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
6. See, e.g., In re Parrot Packing Co, 42 B.R. 323 (N.D. Ind. 1983); In re
Wilson Foods Corp., 31 B.R. 269 (W.D. Okla. 1983); In re Penn Fruit Co., 1 B.R.
714 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
7. See, e.g., In re Briggs Transp. Co., 39 B.R. 343 (Bankr. D. Minn.), aff'd,
Briggs Transp. Co. v. Local 710, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 40 B.R. 972 (D. Minn.),
aff'd, 739 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 917 (1984); In re Brada
Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 16 B.R. 1002 (N.D. Ala. 1981), rev'd, 702 F.2d 890
(11th Cir. 1983); In re Gray Truck Line Co., 34 B.R. 174 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1983); In re Blue Ribbon Transp. Co., 30 B.R. 783 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); In re
U.S. Truck Co., 24 B.R. 853 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
8. See, e.g., In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
appeal dismissed, 595 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1979). See also Shopmen's Local
Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(denying rejection), rev'd, 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975) (granting rejection).
9. For a summary of decisions approving rejection of collective bargaining
agreements before the enactment of § 1113, see HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra
note 3, at 52-53 & nn.236-37. For a discussion of economic distress in unionized
industries during this period, see Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Financial
Crises Upon Collective BargainingRelationships, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 465,
470-71 (1988).
10. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
11. Id. at 530.
12. Id. at 532-33.
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against a debtor-employer attempting to reorganize his or her
financial affairs under Chapter 11.'"
4
Although there were many criticisms of Bildisco,' labor's loudest complaint was that the decision unfairly permitted resort to economic self-help. 15 An employer-debtor could
ignore his union bargaining partner and unilaterally change6
the terms and conditions of employment without penalty.'
But federal labor policy, as enshrined in the National Labor
Relations Act, requires the opposite: the employer must bar7
gain before he is permitted to implement changes. 1 Unilateral modifications in the terms and conditions of employment
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement may
constitute not only a breach of contract,'" but also an independent violation of federal labor law.19 Bildisco, however,
virtually eliminated the duty to bargain under the NLRA
whenever an employer could claim inconvenience due to financial distress.20 Labor's criticism was so swift and strenuous that a bill to overturn Bildisco was introduced in Con13. See El San Juan Hotel Corp., 274 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1320 (1985); Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 224 (1985), enforced, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2905 (6th Cir. 1986); Briggs Transp. Co., 276
N.L.R.B. No. 149, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1267 (1985). See also generally HAGGARD
& PULLIAM, supra note 3, at 127-30 (arguing that extent of debtor-employer's
unfair labor practice liability for making unilateral changes once Chapter 11
petition has been filed is extremely limited).
14. For two excellent summaries of labor's fears about Bildisco, see David
L. Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme Court's Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C. L. REV. 539, 554-55 & n.75 (1984),
and James J. White, The Bildisco Case and the Congressional Response, 30
WAYNE L. REV. 1169, 1202-03 (1984).
15. See B. Glenn George, Collective Bargainingin Chapter 11 and Beyond,
95 YALE L.J. 300, 303 (1985). Of course, as in any rejection of executory obligations, the debtor's rejection of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a
breach of contract creating a general unsecured claim for damages. Bildisco,
465 U.S. at 530 & n.12. Numerous commentators have argued that Bildisco
merely reflects a fundamental "conflict" between federal labor policy favoring
bilateral negotiations, and federal bankruptcy policy favoring unilateral action
by the debtor to help him get back on his feet. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
16. Id.
17. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988) [hereinafter NLRAI.
18. Id. § 8(a)(5).
19. A unilateral change is a per se violation of the duty to bargain imposed
by NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743
(1962).
20. See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 3, at 115-170.
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gress the same day the decision was announced. 2 1 Less than
five months later, in what many observers considered to be
record time,2 2 section 1113 became law. Although organized
labor did not get everything it wanted in the new legislation,2 3 many of labor's supporters immediately proclaimed
victory as to labor's twin goals of reversing the right of employers to engage in economic self-help during Chapter 11,
and making it harder for bankruptcy courts to approve the
24
rejection of collective bargaining agreements.
Section 1113 purports to place nine new steps before a
Chapter 11 debtor who wishes to reject his or her collective
bargaining agreement. 25 The debtor must (1) make the union
a proposal that (2) is based on the most complete information
available, (3) provides for those modifications in the existing
contract that are necessary to permit the debtor's reorganization, and (4) assures that all creditors, the debtor, and all affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.2 6 The debtor
must also (5) provide the union with such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal 27 and (6) meet
21. See H.R. 4908, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 103 CONG. REc. H809 (daily ed.
Feb. 22, 1984) (bill introduced by Rep. Rodino). Congressman Rodino later incorporated this bill into omnibus legislation that, after substantial amendment,
became law. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H7491 (daily
ed. Mar. 19, 1984) (bill introduced by Rep. Rodino). For a comprehensive summary of the legislative history, see Bruce H. Charnov, The Uses and Misuses of
the Legislative History of Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 40 SYR. L. REv.
925, 946-69 (1989).
22. One Congressman called the speed at which the House bill was acted
upon "mind-boggling." 130 CONG. REC. H1798 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
23. See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 3, at 69-70, 81.
24. Senator Kennedy said that the intent of § 1113 was "to overturn the
Bildisco decision which had given the [employer] all but unlimited discretionary power to repudiate labor contracts and to substitute a rule of law that encourages the parties to solve their mutual problems through the collective bargaining process." 130 CONG. REC. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy).
25. The nine-step characterization was conceived by Judge Kressel in In re
American Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). Most bankruptcy
courts refer to these nine steps when analyzing applications to rejection collective bargaining agreements under § 1113. See infra text accompanying note
291. For a careful analysis of the statute and the socioeconomic context of
which it is a product, see generally Martha West, Life After Bildisco: Section
1113 and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 65 (1986).
26. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A); 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(4)
(1988).
27. Id. § 1113(b)(1)(B).
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28
and confer with the union (7) in good faith. If the union has
29
refused to accept such proposal (8) without good cause, ° and
if (9) the balance of equities clearly favors rejection, then
and only then may the bankruptcy judge issue an order
granting rejection.
Section 1113's dramatic changes in the law governing
collective bargaining for employers in financial distress has
generated substantial litigation.3 1 In the decade since its
passage, the bankruptcy courts have reported forty-six decisions in which the debtor filed at least one application under
section 1113 for relief of some type from a collective bargaining agreement. 32 In thirty-eight of those decisions, the debtor
filed at least one application to reject a union contract
altogether. 3
The litigation of these applications has also generated a
considerable volume of scholarly comment. Some has pro34
nounced the statute a success for labor, and some, a fail35
ure, but the lion's share has focused on a rather narrow is28. Id. § 1113(b)(2).
29. Id. § 1113(c)(2).
30. Id. § 1113(c)(3).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 199-252.
32. See infra apps. B & C.
33. See infra app. B.
34. See, e.g., Charlene R. Ehrenwerth & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The New
Bankruptcy Proceduresfor Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements: Is the
Pendulum Swinging Back?, 23 DuQ. L. REV. 939, 980 (1985) (arguing "pendulum" no longer "swinging against labor"); David L. Gregory, Legal Developments
Since NLRB v. Bildisco: Partial Resolution of Problems Surrounding Labor
Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy, 62 DEN. U. L. REV. 615, 625 (1985) (discussing "significant rectification" of Bildisco, although labor interests remain
.subordinated to those of ownership"); Donald H.J. Hermann & David M. Neff,
Rush to Judgment: CongressionalResponse to JudicialRecognition of Rejection
of Collective BargainingAgreements Under Chapter11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
27 ARiuz. L. REV. 617, 643 (1985) (believing decisions "continue to balance fairly"
labor and bankruptcy policy); Richard L. Merrick, The Bankruptcy Dynamics of
Collective BargainingAgreements, 91 COM. L.J. 169, 176-77 (1986) (arguing
union claims enlarged at the expense of other creditors' claims); D'Anne
Haydel, Note, Bildisco:Are Some CreditorsMore Equal Than Others?, 35 S.C.
L. REV. 573, 613-14 (1984) (believing "dramatically pro-labor" statute treats
some creditors, in "Orwellian" sense, "more equally than others"); Judith
DeMeester Nichols, Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by
Chapter 11 Debtors:The Necessity Requirement Under Section 1113, 21 GA. L.
REV. 967, 1000-01 (1987) (arguing § 1113 is unneeded "pro-labor" enactment).
35. See, e.g, Andrew Stewart, Title III, Subtitle J of the 1984 Bankruptcy
Amendments and FederalJudgeshipAct: An Adequate Compromise Between the
Bankruptcy Act and National Labor Relations Act?, 1985 DET. C. L. REV. 735,
764, 766 (discussing early post-enactment concern that bankruptcy courts
"have shown tendency to completely disregard labor law concerns," although
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sue: the meaning of the term "necessary," and whether the
debtor's proposed changes are "necessary" to permit reorganization as required in step three.3 6
The focus on "necessary" is curious. Can it be that one
step out of the nine established by the statute is so important
that it must be studied to the exclusion of all the others? Or
are the other steps merely window-dressing for what is really
37
a one-step inquiry?

adequacy "remains to be seen"); White, supra note 14, at 1198 (believing bankruptcy courts "will continue routinely to reject collective bargaining agreements"); Anne J. McClain, Note, Bankruptcy Code Section 1113 and the Simple
Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements: Labor Loses Again, 80 GEO. L.J.
191, 191 (1991) (arguing statute "has actually placed laborers in a worse position than before its enactment"); Gary M. Roberts, Note, Bankruptcy and the
Union's Bargain:Equitable Treatment of Collective BargainingAgreements, 39
STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1041 (1987) (believing law "improperly" limits union's right
outside bankruptcy to "firm" guarantee of integrity of contract); Raymond N.
Hulser, Note, The Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements in Chapter 11
Reorganizations:The Need for Informed JudicialDecisions, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
1235, 1236 (1986) (contending § 1113 is "inadequate" because bankruptcy
judges have little or no experience applying labor law).
36. See, e.g., Carlos J. Cuevas, Necessary Modifications and Section 1113 of
the Bankruptcy Code: A Search for the Substantive Standard for Modification of
a Collective Bargaining Agreement in a Corporate Reorganization, 64 Am.
BANKa. L. J. 133, 135 & n.5 (1990) (discussing "focus" of article); John Vian, The
Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements Since the 1984 Amendments: The
Case Law Under Bankruptcy Code Section 1113, 91 COM. L.J. 252, 266 (1986)
(arguing steps three and four are "two most important requirements"); Nichols,
supra note 34, at 972 & n.13 (half of 15 decisions studied "turned on" step
three); Hulser, supra note 35, at 1249 (arguing bankruptcy courts collapse steps
four and eight into step three). For other commentary analyzing the meaning
of "necessary," see, e.g., Charnov, supra note 21, at 975-1002; William A. Wines,
An Overview of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments: Some Modest Protectionsfor
LaborAgreements, 36 LAB. L.J. 911, 917 (1985); Elizabeth P. Gilson, Note, Statutory Protectionfor Union Contractsin Chapter 11 ReorganizationProceedings:
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 19 CONN. L. REV. 401,
425-26 (1987); Jay M. Rector, Comment, Bankruptcy-How Necessary Is "Necessary" Under Section 1113? Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation,
13 J. CORP. L. 941, 941, 947-52 (1988); Jeffrey D. Berman, Note, Rejection of
Collective BargainingAgreements Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984,
71 VA. L. REV. 983, 1009 (1985); Roberts, supra note 35, at 1048. But see Jeffrey
W. Berkman, Note, Nobody Likes Rejection Unless You're a Debtor in Chapter
11: Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements Under 11 U.S.C. § 1113, 34
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 169, 174, 187 & nn.149-51 (1989) (arguing that although
meaning of "necessary" is "paramount issue" to bankruptcy courts, steps four,
eight, and nine seem most important); McClain, supra note 35, at 208 (criticiz-.
ing courts for focusing on step three). For one of the more thoughtful considerations of the "necessary" requirement, see Daniel Keating, The Continuing Puzzle of Collective BargainingAgreements in Bankruptcy, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
503, 526-34 (1994).
37. At least one commentator has recently so concluded. See McClain,
supra note 35, at 208.
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This article reports and analyzes empirical data gathered to evaluate section 1113. Part II explores the ideology of
section 1113 by examining the law before the statute, the enactment of the statute, and the statute's unique alterations to
basic American labor law. Part III explains the methodology
of the study, including how the data were gathered and analyzed. Part IV reports what the data show regarding three
central hypotheses:
Hypothesis #1-That fewer collective bargaining agreements are rejected now than before section 1113 was enacted.
The reason: placing nine new steps between debtors and rejection, if only because debtors have more work to do, seems
intuitively to mean that the rejection rate would decrease.
The data show that, although rejection continues to be
granted more often than not, there is support for the hypotheto be rejected today than
sis. Union contracts are less likely
38
before the passage of the statute.

Hypothesis #2-That the employer's conduct at the bargaining table, not the merit of his arguments for rejection,
most determines the fate of the collective bargaining agreement under the typical section 1113 application. The procedural steps debtors must climb before rejection under section
1113 (steps one, two, five, six, and seven) should be at least as
important as the new substantive ones (steps three, four,
eight, and nine), including the "necessary" requirement in
step three. The reason: procedural obligations nominally
similar to those found in section 1113 are the heart and soul
of the long-established duty to bargain under the NLRA.
Surprisingly, the data show that the hypothesis is largely unsupported.3 9 In the average case, the opposite is true: substantive steps, particularly step three, are more significant
than procedural ones.
Hypothesis #3-The more bargaining that fails to produce a settlement, the more likely that rejection will be
granted. The reason: if the parties engage in good-faith negotiations, but are unable to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, the bankruptcy court will "reward" the debtor for having at least engaged in the effort. The data strongly support
this hypothesis.40
38. See infra text accompanying notes 330-367.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 373-390.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 394-405.

848

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

Part V considers potential limitations of the data, offers
some reflections on the findings, and suggests areas for further research. Finally, Part VI concludes that, although section 1113 is a substantial improvement over the pre-Bildisco
regime, it is not working as well as it should. The bankruptcy
courts, with Congress' assistance, should focus their attention on the process, rather than the product, of collective bargaining during reorganizations.
II. THE IDEOLOGY OF SECTION 1113
The ideology of section 1113 is the product of accommodation. In enacting the statute, Congress attempted to reconcile a perceived conflict 4 ' between federal labor policy, which
preserves the making and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, and federal bankruptcy policy, which is said
to favor the rehabilitation of debtors, even at the expense of
such agreements. 42 To understand how section 1113 has attempted to accommodate the clash of these competing policies, it is important to understand the pressure points that
existed between these bodies of law before the statute was
passed.
A.

Treatment of Collective BargainingAgreements Before
Section 1113
43
For years, the settled interpretation of section 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA has been than an employer must bargain to impasse with the union representing its employees before he
41. See infra note 42. The commentary notwithstanding, there is no irreconcilable "conflict" between national labor policy and bankruptcy law policy, because it is not axiomatic that the Bankruptcy Code reflects the type of substantive policy choices that labor law does. Although this article must leave
exploration of the matter for another time and place, the groundwork supporting the point has been thoughtfully laid by others. See Thomas H. Jackson,

TranslatingAssets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
73, 97-98 (1985); Roberts, supra note 35, at 1041. But see Donald R. Korobkin,
Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decision-Making,33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
333, 339-41 (1992) (criticizing "economic account" of bankruptcy theory and offering a "value-based" account).

42. There is no shortage of commentators remarking upon this perceived
conflict. See, e.g., George, supra note 15, at 311 (arguing a "direct conflict");
Gregory, supra note 14, at 547 (discussing "fundamentally different" policy perspectives); Stewart, supra note 35, at 737-41 (believing there is a "basic

conflict").
43. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain

collectively with the representatives of his employees.. ."
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).

NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29
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may implement changes in the terms and conditions of em45
ployment. 4 4 Moreover, as defined in section 8(d) of the Act,
section 8(a)(5) forbids mid-term unilateral changes in a col46
lective bargaining agreement. The employer may not terminate or modify the contract prior to expiration without the
union's consent.47 Together, these provisions impose a duty
to bargain that prohibits self-help by employers. The union's
only recourse for violation of this duty is to pursue an unfair
for which lies
labor practice charge, the exclusive jurisdiction
48 The duty to barBoard.
Relations
with the National Labor
gain has often been cited as the cornerstone of our national
labor policy.

49

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code permits financially
troubled employers to avoid liquidation by reorganizing50their
affairs under the supervision of the bankruptcy court. Or51
dinarily, under section 365(a) of the Code (and its predecessor, section 313(1)52 of the old Bankruptcy Act), a debtor-in44. See generally NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
45. Section 8(d) of the NLRA states in pertinent part:
[W]here there is in effect a collective bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or
modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or
modification ... continues in full force and effect ... all the terms of
the existing contract ... until the expiration date of such contract ....
NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
46. The purpose of § 8(d) is to avoid interruptions to interstate commerce
&
caused by industrial warfare, especially strikes. See, e.g., Allied Chemical
Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 187 (1971).
47. Id.
48. The same conduct constituting an unfair labor practice in violation of
the statutorily imposed duty to bargain, however, may also constitute a breach
of contract for which the union may pursue a separate and independent remedy
under the grievance and arbitration machinery established by the contract
itself.
49. See, e.g., George, supra note 15, at 328.
50. See generally Hal Hughes, Wavering Between the Profits and the Loss:
Operating a Business During Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the New
Bankruptcy Code, 54 Am. BANKR. L. J. 45, 69 (1980).
51. "Except as provided [herein], the trustee, subject to the court's approval,
may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."
Bankruptcy Code, § 365(a), 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
52. Section 313(1) of the old Bankruptcy Act states, in pertinent part:
Upon the filing of a petition [for reorganization under Chapter XI], the
court may, in addition to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties conferred
and imposed upon it by this chapter ... permit the rejection of the
executory contracts of the debtor, upon notice to the parties to such
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possession may assume or reject any executory contract 5 3 or
unexpired lease, subject to bankruptcy court approval. Such
approval is rarely denied.5 4 Under the "business judgment"
test, the debtor must show merely that rejection of the executory contract will benefit the estate.5 5 It is not necessary to

show that the contract is burdensome by any objective eco-

nomic measure.5 6 Although rejection is treated as a breach of
contract, 5 7 it permanently relieves the debtor of having to

perform any remaining obligations thereunder. 5 The creditor's only recourse for such breach lies in pursuing a general
unsecured claim for pre-petition damages, 59 for which the exclusive jurisdiction lies in the bankruptcy court-notwithstanding any arrangements to the contrary that either the
parties or nonbankruptcy law has made.6 0
The duty to bargain under the NLRA and the treatment
of executory contracts under the Bankruptcy Code co-exist in
perfect harmony until the employer becomes a debtor-in-possession who seeks to benefit the estate by rejecting his
contracts and to such other parties in interest as the court may
designate.
HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 3, at 16-17 (citing Chandler Bankruptcy
Amendments Act of 1938, Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, § 313(1), 11 U.S.C. § 713(1)
(repealed 1978) [hereinafter Chandler Act]). Section 313(1) governed all bankruptcies filed prior to October 1, 1979, the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code
now in force. Id. at 16 & n.49. The Chandler Act restated the authority to
reject executory contracts provided in the old Bankruptcy Act and pre-1938
amendments to it. Id. at 16 & n.48 (citing Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, Ch.
541, 30 Stat. 544, codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (repealed 1978)).
For a summary of this history, see id. at 16.
53. Although the term "executory contract" was defined in neither the
Bankruptcy Act nor the Bankruptcy Code, it has been generally understood to
include contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both
sides. See Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57
MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Group of Inst'l Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 550 (1943).
56. See, e.g., In re Lafayette Radio Elec. Corp., 8 B.R. 528, 533 (Bankr. E.D.
N.Y. 1981).
57. Bankruptcy Code, § 365(g)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (1988).
58. NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 532 (1984).
59. Bankruptcy Code, § 502(c), 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) 1988 (providing for estimation of claims).
60. The proper priority of workers' claims in bankruptcy only recently has
received significant attention. See, e.g., Daniel Keating, The Fruits of Labor:
Worker Prioritiesin Bankruptcy, 35 Amiz. L. REV. 905 (1993). See Bankruptcy
Code § 362(a), 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988) (providing for automatic stay).
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61
unexpired collective bargaining agreement. Then the pressure points appear: is a collective bargaining agreement an
executory contract capable of rejection under section
365(a)?62 If so, does the business judgment test set the standard for rejection, or does national labor policy require a

higher one?6 3 In either case, does rejection (or an attempt to

reject) constitute an unfair labor practice under section
8(a)(5)? 64 And finally, who has jurisdiction to decide these
questions-the NLRB, the bankruptcy court, or neither?
Remarkably, even though Congress codified both of the
relevant labor and bankruptcy law provisions during the mid1930's,65 these pressure points did not appear, and therefore

were not widely discussed, for the better part of the next forty
years. 66 The development of the law governing the intersection of the duty to bargain under the NLRA and the treatment of collective bargaining agreements as executory contracts in reorganization proceedings may be divided into
roughly three periods: inactivity (1935-1975), activity (19751984), and reform (1984-present).
1. Inactivity: 1935-1975
The Wagner Act, which established collective bargaining
as the cornerstone of our national labor policy, became law in
1935.67 The Chandler Act, which included among its amendments to the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898 a recodification of
61.
62.
63.
64.

See
See
See
See

HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 3, at 68.
infra text accompanying notes 69-171.
infra text accompanying notes 69-171.
infra text accompanying notes 69-171.

65. Section 8(5) of the Wagner Act, which first imposed the duty to bargain,

372,
was enacted in 1935. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch.

Stat. 449, 452-53 (1935), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.

§ 8(5),

49

§ 158(a)(5) (1988).

to reject execuSection 313(1) of the Chandler Act, which recodified the power
U.S.C. § 713(1)
11
313(1),
§
Act,
Chandler
1938.
in
enacted
was
tory contracts,
modi(1988). Although § 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which prohibits mid-term

its
fications without the union's consent, was not added to the NLRA until 1947,

potential prespassage, too, had little immediate effect in demonstrating the

sure points between the two statutory schemes.
66. In only one area was Congress explicit about the treatment of collective
from
bargaining agreements in reorganization proceedings: the Act excluded
Act
the rejection power contracts covering railroad employees. See Bankruptcy
U.S.C.
11
at
amended
as
codified
(1935),
923
911,
Ch. 774, § 77(n), 49 Stat.

in the
205(n) (1976) (repealed 1978). This exception has been preserved
(1988).
1167
§
U.S.C.
11
1167,
§
Code,
Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy Code. See
& PULLIAM,
67. Wagner Act, supra note 65, §§ 151-169. See also HAGGARD

§

supra note 3, at 12 n.26.
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the trustee's power to reject executory contracts, became law
in 1938.68 Although the New Deal Congress passed both
measures in the space of three years, neither law made any
reference to the other, much less addressed the pressure
points raised above. As far as anyone can tell, the legislative
history did not address these potential conflicts, either.6 9
For a while it did not matter, for no reported decision involving rejection of a collective bargaining agreement appeared until 1945.70 Even then, the trustee's power to reject
the contract, exercised under Chapter X of the old Act, was
not questioned. 7 1 Instead, the district court was mainly concerned with the proper treatment of severance pay claims
arising in a proceeding where the trustee had explicitly failed
to accept or reject the contract in a timely manner.7 2
In fact, no reported decision squarely addressed the pressure points between the two statutory schemes until 1959. In
In re Klaber Brothers,Inc. ,7 the employer had filed for reorganization under Chapter XI of the old Act.7 4 As part of its
reorganization, and pursuant to section 313(1) of the old Act,
the trustee sought to reject an unexpired collective bargaining agreement.7 5 The referee ruled that the contract was "a
burden on the estate" and summarily granted rejection.76 On
appeal to the district court, the union made three arguments:
(1) the NLRA pre-empted section 713(1); (2) the NLRB had
68. Chandler Act, supra note 53, §§ 1-1103 (repealed 1978). See also HAG& PULLIAM, supra note 3, at 11 n.18.
69. For a summary, see HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 3, at 24-48.
70. See In re Public Ledger, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947). Dicta in at least two other
early cases reaffirmed that settled bankruptcy law principles apply to proceedings involving debtors party to collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding
debtor-employers are responsible for unfair labor practices occurring during reorganizations); In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 478, 480 (S.D.N.Y.
1935) (holding rejection is to be denied where debtor-employer's motivation in
filing petition is simply to avoid improvident contract).
71. See Public Ledger, 63 F. Supp. at 1008.
72. Id. at 1013 ("The instant case demonstrates the difficulties which are
likely to arise when Trustees in bankruptcy fail to expressly adopt or reject
executory contracts as expediently as possible.").
73. 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 85.
GARD
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in
exclusive jurisdiction over rejections of such contracts
7
bankruptcy; and (3) the referee abused his authority.78
The district court rejected all three arguments. As to
pre-emption, it quoted with approval from the decision of the
referee, who ruled:
"The Bankruptcy Act makes no distinction among classes
of executory contracts. The power to permit rejection of
an executory contract should be exercised where rejection
is to the advantage of the estate . . . ." I likewise conclude
that there should be no differentiation in the treatment of
executory employment or collective bargaining contracts
79
of this case.
as to termination under the circumstances
As to the argument that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction, the district court was equally conclusory. It characterized as "immaterial" the union's filing unfair labor practice
80
charges for unilateral rejection and refusal to bargain, noting, "[t]he National Labor Relations Board, in my opinion,
of an
has no jurisdiction here to interfere with the rejection
" 81
so.
do
to
attempting
not
is
executory contract .... It
Finally, as to the argument that the referee abused his
authority, the district court acknowledged the testimony of a
union witness, who had recognized the burden the contract
placed on the estate and offered the employer certain concessions. 8 2 But citing Collier's bankruptcy treatise for the proposition that an executory contract cannot be accepted or rethat the
jected piecemeal, 3 the district court concluded
84
justified."
"fully
was
referee's grant of rejection
Another six years passed before the next key decision. In
85
In re Overseas National Airways, Inc., the referee had permitted the debtor, a commercial air carrier operating under
the old Chapter XI, to reject two collective bargaining agree"onerous and
ments under section 313(1) because they were
8 7 Section 77(n) 88
86
reversed.
court
district
The
burdensome."
77. Id. at 84-85.
78. In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. In re Kiaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (citation
omitted).
84. Id. at 85.
85. 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
86. Id. at 359.
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of the Act exempted from rejection under section 313(1) contracts entered into by carriers operating under the Railway
Labor Act (RLA),89 which governed then, as it does now, collective bargaining in both the air and rail transportation industries. 90 The district court ruled that under section 77(n),
a debtor was prohibited from making mid-term modifications
in any collective bargaining agreement, no matter how "onerous and burdensome," except in accordance with the elaborate procedures for negotiation, mediation, and arbitration
prescribed by section 6 of the RLA.9 1 Klaber Brothers92 was
distinguished as involving a contract governed by the NLRA,
for which the Bankruptcy Act provided no exemption. 93 Section 77(n), 94 together with section 1167, 9" its successor under
the Bankruptcy Code, was Congress' only pre-section 1113
rule providing explicitly for special treatment of collective
bargaining agreements in bankruptcy.
What made Overseas National Airways96 an important
case was not its narrow holding-for attempts to reject labor
contracts have been rare in both the railway and, until the
87. Id. at 362.
88. "No judge or trustee acting under this title shall change the wages or
working conditions of railroad employees except in the manner prescribed in
The Railway Labor Act." Bankruptcy Act, § 77(n), 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1976)
(repealed 1978).
89. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1988).
90. Id.
91. In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 359- 61 (E.D.N.Y.
1965). See also Railroad Labor Act § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1988) (setting forth
procedures).
92. 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
93. Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. at 360-61.
94. Bankruptcy Act, Ch. 774, § 77(n), 49 Stat. 911, 923 (1935), codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1976) (repealed 1978).
95. Bankruptcy Code, § 1167, 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1988). Although it is undisputed that § 1167 exempts from rejection labor contracts with rail carriers, it is
an unresolved question whether the same is true of labor contracts with air
carriers. Most courts confronted with the question have held § 1167 does not
exempt such contracts. See, e.g., In re Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 48 B.R. 440, 443
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 25 B.R. 216, 217 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1982); accord In re Funding Sys. Railcars, Inc., 15 B.R. 611, 616
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981) ("[Section] 1168 [like section 1167] is applicable only to
cases proceeding under Subchapter IV of Chapter 11," i.e., those cases concerning a railroad.). But see In re Michigan Interstate Ry. Co., Inc., 34 B.R. 220, 227
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983). At least one commentator agrees with the majority.
See, e.g., James J. McDonald, Jr., Bankruptcy Reorganization:Labor Considerations for the Debtor-Employer, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 7, 30 (1985).
96. In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
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early 1980's, airline industries 97 -but rather its dicta. Without citing authority, 98 the district court stated that a bankruptcy court, when it does have the power to reject a collective bargaining agreement,
should do so only after thorough scrutiny, and a careful
balancing of the equities on both sides, for, in relieving a
debtor from its [contractual] obligations ... it may be de-

priving the employees affected of their seniority, welfare
and pension rights, as well as other valuable benefits
which are incapable of the forming the basis of a provable
claim for money damages. That would leave the employees without compensation for their losses, at the same
time enabling the debtor, at the expense of the employees,
to consummate what may be a more favorable plan of arrangement with its other creditors. 99
The district court's "thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities" 100 dictum marked the first published
departure from the "business judgment" rule for evaluating
an application to reject a collective bargaining agreement in
bankruptcy. Of course, since the enactment of the Code in
1978, the difficulty of proving actual damages is no longer a
legal obstacle to the claims of employees under a rejected collective bargaining agreement; the bankruptcy court must estimate them anyway. 101 But this was not true under the Act,
and the district court's dictum may have been born of genuine
concern for the fate of the employees' claims under then-existing law. Or, as at least one pair of commentators has suggested, it may have been nothing more than a barb directed
at "the learned Referee."' 0 2 In any event, the district court
offered no explanation for what appeared to be a new test.
97. See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines, 38 B.R. 67 (Bankr. S.D. Texas
1984); In re Braniff Airlines, Inc., 25 B.R. 216 (Bankr. N.D. 1982).
98. Before offering a new test for rejection, the district court, also in dicta,
reviewed the evidence and declared clearly erroneous the referee's finding that
the contract was "onerous and burdensome." Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F.
Supp. at 361. The district court then dismissed the union's argument that the
contract was not "executory," and therefore, the contract was not rejectable. Id.
99. Id. at 361-62 (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. Compare Chandler Act, 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (repealed 1978), § 57d (permitting disallowance of claim if too difficult to estimate) with 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)
(1982) (requiring estimation of "any" contingent or unliquidated claim). See
also, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 530 n.12 (1984).
102. HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 3, at 28 (quoting In re Overseas Nat'l
Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)).
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The last significant decision of the inactivity period was
issued in 1968. In Carpenters Local Union No. 2746 v.
Turney Wood Products, Inc.,1 3 the employer, involved in a
"straight" bankruptcy proceeding for liquidation under
section 70b 10 4 of the Act, sought to reject a collective bargaining
agreement whose enforcement outside bankruptcy ordinarily
would have been governed by the NLRA.10 5 The union responded by bringing an action against the trustee for specific
performance on the theory that the NLRA pre-empted the
Bankruptcy Act." ° ' Meanwhile, the employer filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, the trustee resumed operations,
107
and the referee authorized rejection.
The district court saw the principal issue as whether the
referee had the power to reject the contract.10 8 The answer,
the district court held, was yes:
It is clear that to uphold the contention of the Union
would imply a conflict between federal legislation in the
labor relations field, on the one hand, and the Bankruptcy
Act, on the other hand. The Court does not believe that
any such conflict exists if the two bodies of legislation are
read together and properly construed.
The National Labor Relations Act was adopted in
1935. The Chandler Bankruptcy Act was passed in 1938;
. . . The Taft-Hartley Act [amending the NLRA] was
adopted in 1947 ....
Neither the labor legislation of the Congress nor the
Bankruptcy Act contains any language which would generally exclude collective bargaining agreements from the
operation of section 70b. Had Congress desired that there
be such general exclusion, it surely would have said so. 10 9
As the district court noted, the only place in which Congress had "said so" was section 77(n), which exempted labor
contracts governed by the RLA-but not the NLRA-from

103.

289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968).

104. Chandler Act, supra note 101, § 70b.
105. See Turney Wood, 289 F. Supp. at 144.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 145-46.
108. The proper standard for rejection was not addressed.

109. Carpenters Local Union No. 2746 v. Turney Wood Prods., 289 F. Supp.
143, 148-49 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
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the rejection power. 110 Therefore, rejection here was
appropriate.111
Thus, the groundwork had been laid for future analyses
of the pressure points. During most of this early period,
bankruptcy courts, and the district courts supervising them,
saw no particular need to accommodate any perceived conflicts between labor and bankruptcy law. Outside those industries governed by the RLA, the courts permitted debtors
to exercise essentially the same power to reject collective bargaining agreements that they enjoyed regarding other
contracts.
2. Activity: 1975-1984
In contrast to the handful of pertinent decisions issued
during the previous forty years, from 1975 to 1984, the bankruptcy courts, presented with a wave of reorganization petitions by debtor-employers, produced fifty-four reported decisions, in which at least one application to reject a collective
bargaining agreement was filed.' 12 The floodgates broke
with the publication in 1975 of two separate decisions by the
Second Circuit: Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin
Railway, Airline &
Steel Products,Inc.113 and Brotherhood1of
14
Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.
In Kevin Steel, the employer, a steel fabricator, attempted to cut labor costs by making unilateral changes in its
collective bargaining agreement. 115 After the union responded by filing unfair labor practice charges contending
that the changes violated the duty to bargain under section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA, the employer filed a petition for reorganthe conization and successfully sought permission to reject
1 16
Act.
Bankruptcy
the
of
313(1)
section
under
tract
110. Id. at 149.
111. Id.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 336-345 & app. D.
113. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
114. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975). For a
summary of the impact of these two cases, see Stephan E. Becker, Note, The
Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective BargainingAgreements, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 391 (1981).

115. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 700.
116. Id.
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The two matters proceeded separately.' 1 7 The union appealed the rejection order, and the district court reversed.1 1 8
Notwithstanding section 313(1), the district court ruled that
"Congress intended to distinguish collective bargaining
agreements as a class from all other contracts," even if the
contract, like the one in question, is "burdensome and onerous." 1 9 Meanwhile, the Board determined that the debtor
had committed an unfair labor practice and issued a standard
make-whole order setting aside the changes and requiring
the employer to bargain. 12 0 The Board's decision gave little,
if any, weight to the orders of either the bankruptcy or district judges.121
The debtor appealed the district court's order disallowing
rejection; 1 22 the Board petitioned for enforcement of its order
finding an unfair labor practice, 1 23 and the proceedings were
consolidated. 1 24 Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge Wilfred Feinberg framed the issue dramatically: "This case
squarely presents to an appellate court, apparently for the
first time, the question whether section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act allows rejection of a collective bargaining agreement as an executory contract. We conclude that the answer
is yes .. .125
But the Second Circuit's "yes" was not unequivocal, for
Judge Feinberg's opinion considered the arguments of the
parties at length. 126 In fact, the appellate court actually considered two questions: whether collective bargaining agreements may be rejected, and if so, when they may be
1 27
rejected.
The union and the Board argued that the NLRA and the
Bankruptcy Act were in conflict and could be reconciled only
117. Id. at 701.
118. Id.
119. In re Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 336, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
rev'd, 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
120. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 493, 499-500 (1974).
121. Id.
122. Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d
698, 701 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 700.
126. See id. at 701-06. See also HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 3, at 30.
127. Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d
698, 706 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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by restricting the rejection power of section 313(1);128 that
the lower court authorities, including among others Klaber
Brothers, Overseas National Airways, and Turney Wood
Products, were "few," "not controlling," or "wrongly decided;"129 and that Congress had recognized the special status of collective bargaining agreements by enacting section
77(n). 130 The debtor argued that the plain language of section 313(1) was broad and admitted of no explicit exceptions, 13 1 that the lower court authorities were unanimous and
correctly decided, 132 and that section 77(n) supported rather
than undermined the debtor's position by explicitly granting
favorable status to labor contracts governed by the RLA while
implicitly denying the same to those governed by the
NLRA.

13 3

As to the question of whether the collective bargaining
agreements may be rejected, the Second Circuit acknowledged that "the debtor has the better of it in these volleys
back and forth" and held that section 313(1) plainly permit34
ted the rejection of collective bargaining agreements.1 The
in
appellate court suggested that support for so holding lay
35 betheory:'
entity"
"new
the
what soon became known as
cause the act of filing a petition for reorganization transforms
the pre-petition debtor into a post-petition debtor-in-possession-with all the attendant rights and obligations of bankruptcy law-the employer becomes a "new entity" for purposes of determining its continuing contractual obligations, if
any, under labor law. 136 By analogy to decisions interpreting
section 8(d) of the NLRA, 137 the Second Circuit suggested
that a debtor-in-possession is permitted to reject the contract
because it was never party to the contract in the first
128. Id. at 702.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 703.
131. Id. at 701.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 702.
134. Id. at 703, 706.
135. Id. at 704.
136. For an explanation of the "new entity" theory, see HAGGARD & PULLIAM,
supra note 3, at 35-36.
137. See, e.g., Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249, 259 & n.5 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281-91 (1972)..
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place. 138 At best, the debtor-in-possession may be a "successor employer" having a duty merely to bargain with the union
139
rather than to assume the whole contract.
But as to the question of when collective bargaining
agreements may be rejected, the Second Circuit did not agree
that the traditional business judgment test governed rejection. 14 0 Citing OverseasNational Airways14 1 rather than any
statutory or doctrinal authority, the Kevin Steel panel held
that rejection of a collective bargaining agreement requires
"thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities on
both sides." 4 2 It warned: "The decision to allow rejection
should not be based solely on whether it will improve the financial status of the debtor. Such a narrow approach totally
ignores the policies of the [NLRA] and makes no attempt to
accommodate them."1 43 The Kevin Steel panel, however, did
not define what level of scrutiny would be considered "thorough," which "equities" should be balanced, and which factors, other than financial status, should influence the decision to grant or deny rejection.
In REA Express,'" issued only a month later, a separate
panel of the Second Circuit attempted to flesh out the missing
details. 145 The employer, a freight carrier whose labor relations were governed by the RLA rather than the NLRA,
sought rejection under section 313(1)146 of a pair of collective
bargaining agreements guaranteeing supplemental unemployment benefits and restricting the carrier's power to consolidate its operations. 147 The carrier considered these provisions obstacles to reorganization. 4 " The bankruptcy court

138. Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d
698, 704 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
139. See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 3, at 35-36.
140. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707.
141. 238 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
142. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707 (quoting Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F.
Supp. at 359).
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
145. Id.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (repealed 1978).
147. REA Express, 523 F.2d at 166-67.
148. Id.
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1 49 The afgranted rejection, and the district court affirmed.
fected unions appealed.15 °
This time, the Second Circuit seemed more determined
to uphold rejection. 1 5 1 Writing for the REA Express panel,
Judge Walter Mansfield had to distinguish Overseas National
Airways, which had held that section 77(n) forbids any
changes in labor contracts in the railway and airline industries except in accordance with the elaborate mediation, negotiation, and arbitration procedures of section 6 of the
RLA. 152 He did so by treating section 8(d) of the NLRA as the
53
virtual equivalent of section 6 of the RLA,1 an unprecedented-and certainly inaccurate-interpretation of the
Railway Labor Act.'5 4 This permitted the RLA to stand in as
a representative of all federal labor laws, including the
NLRA. Now the REA Express panel could resolve the perceived conflict between federal labor law on the one hand and
55
bankruptcy law on the other, by reference to Kevin Steel:
Faced with this apparent conflict, in the language and
purposes of [section 6 of] the RLA and [section 313(1) of]
the Bankruptcy Act, we must give effect to both statutes
to the extent that they are not mutually repugnant. In
the present case we are persuaded, as we were in Kevin

Steel, that this can be accomplished by holding that

where, after careful weighing of all the factors and equities
involved, including the interests sought to be protected by
the RLA, a district court concludes that an onerous and
burdensome executory collective bargaining agreement
149. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.,
523 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
150. Id.
151. See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 3, at 33.
152. In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(citing Bankruptcy Act § 77(n), 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (repealed 1978) and Railway
Labor Act § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1988)).
153. REA Express, 523 F.2d at 168-69.
154. The RLA establishes a distinctive system of industrial relations that
has often been misunderstood by lower federal court judges who are more familiar-and therefore, more comfortable-with the NLRA. See generally THE
RAILWAY LABOR ACT (Douglas Leslie ed.) (forthcoming 1994). At least one expert on labor and bankruptcy issues believed that section 77(n) made rejection
under section 313(1) virtually impossible. See Vern Countryman, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy (pt. 2), 58 MINN. L. REV. 479, 498 (1974) ("[T]he RLA
seems also to preclude any interim relief from the onerous collective bargaining
contract of a railroad or an airline in bankruptcy proceedings.").
155. Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d
698, 704 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

862

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

will thwart efforts to save a failing carrierin bankruptcy
from collapse, the court may under § 313(1) authorize rejection or disaffirmance of the agreement.1 5 6
Of course, the Kevin Steel panel did hold that rejection
required "thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the
equities on both sides."1 5 7 But it never purported to set the
standard for rejection at when the contract "will thwart efforts to save a failing carrier in bankruptcy from collapse" 1 5 8-or, for that matter, at any other level. This gloss
on Kevin Steel was something new.
For good measure, the REA Express panel borrowed and
elaborated on the "new entity" theory first offered by the Kevin Steel panel: "When REA, after going into Chapter XI proceedings, was authorized to operate as the debtor-in-possession, it acted as a new juridical entity. It was not a party to
and was not bound by the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement entered into by REA as debtor ....15
,9
Hence, federal courts presented with applications to reject collective bargaining agreements during reorganization
proceedings began to feel the pull of labor law policy. If these
courts did not explicitly try to accommodate labor law, at
least now they felt compelled to say why. By the time the
Supreme Court decided Bildisco in February 1984, all three
circuits that had considered the matter 16 0 agreed that collective bargaining agreements could be rejected with the proviso
that employers ought to pass a stricter test than business
judgment to secure rejection.161 The Third' 6 2 and Eleventh1 63 Circuits, following Kevin Steel, required the debtor to
156. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.,
523 F.2d 164, 169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975) (emphasis added).
157. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707.
158. The REA Express panel stated the reason for the standard this way:
"Unless the debtor-in-possession is permitted to act promptly, albeit unilaterally, in avoiding onerous employment terms that will prevent it from continuing
as a going concern, the enterprise, and with it the employment of its workers,
may fail." REA Express, 523 F.2d at 170-71.
159. Id. at 170.
160. The Ninth Circuit was presented with, but did not reach, the question.
Local Joint Executive Bd.v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F.2d 210, 213-14 & n.2 (9th
Cir. 1980).
161. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523-24 (1984).
162. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72, 81 (3d Cir.
1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
163. See In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 899-900 (11th
Cir. 1983).
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show that the contract burdened the estate and that the equities balanced in favor of rejection; the Second Circuit, followreoring REA Express, required the debtor to show that 16the
4
permitted.
were
rejection
unless
fail
ganization will
The split in the circuits between the "higher-than-business-judgment" standard of Kevin Steel and the even higher
standard of REA Express set the stage for the beginning of
the reform period-a period1 65that began with the Supreme
Court's decision in Bildisco.

3. Reform: 1984-Present
The details of the Bildisco story have been recounted
elsewhere and need no repetition here. 166 In sum, the debtor,
a building supplies distributor, failed to remit pension and
benefit contributions and to comply with other obligations
under a collective bargaining agreement. 67 The union filed
unfair labor practice charges alleging breach of the duty to
bargain under section 8(a)(5), 6 and the NLRB issued an order so finding.169 Meanwhile, the debtor filed a petition for
reorganization under Chapter 11.170 Afterward, he also refused to pay wage increases as they became due under the
court
contract. 17 1 The debtor sought, and the bankruptcy
72
granted, rejection, and the district court affirmed.'
The Board's petition for enforcement and the union's appeal attacking the district court's grant of rejection were consolidated. After holding that a collective bargaining agreement is an executory contract capable of being rejected under
section 365(a) of the Code, the Third Circuit nevertheless declared the business judgment test too lenient a standard by
which to measure rejection of such a contract. 173 Instead, the
majority embraced the "thorough scrutiny, and a careful bal164. See Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312,
320 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978).
165. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 513.
166. See supra notes 15, 16, & 34.
167. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 517-18 (1984).
168. Id. at 518-19.
169. Bildisco & Bildisco, N.L.R.B. 1203, 1205-06 (1981).
170. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 517.
171. Id. at 518.
172. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 518 (1984).
173. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 78, 80 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd,
465 U.S. 513 (1984).
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ancing of the equities" standard articulated in Kevin Steel,'
but pointedly dismissed as "illegitimate progeny" the "business-will-fail" standard articulated in REA Express.1 5 The
Third Circuit also adopted the "new entity" theory.'
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision.' vv Speaking through Justice Rehnquist, the Court is7
sued a decision in two parts. First, a unanimous Court1
agreed that, due to the "special nature" of the collective bargaining agreement under federal law, a "somewhat stricter
standard" should govern the bankruptcy court's decision to
grant rejection. 179 That standard, the Court held, should be
the one expressed in Kevin Steel; the stricter standard announced in REA Express, it reasoned, was "fundamentally at
odds with the policies of flexibility and equity built into Chapter 11. "180 The Court, however, added something new:
Before acting on a petition to modify or reject a collectivebargaining agreement, however, the Bankruptcy Court
should be persuaded that reasonable efforts to negotiate a
voluntary modification have been made and are not likely
to produce a prompt
and satisfactory solution. The NLRA
8
requires no less.' '
Thus, the Court agreed, at minimum, that reasonable efforts
to negotiate voluntary modifications, and thorough scrutiny
together with careful balancing of the equities by the bank8 2
ruptcy judge, must all precede the grant of rejection.1
Second, a closely divided Court ruled that the debtor's resort to self-help-breaching the contract first, and seeking
bankruptcy court approval for rejection afterward-did not
violate the duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5). ls3 Writing
now for a majority of five Justices,18 4 Justice Rehnquist summarily dismissed the "new entity" theory as a rationale for
174. Id. at 80.
175. Id. at 81.
176. Id.
177. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 517 (1984).
178. Id. at 515, 521-27.
179. Id. at 524.
180. Id. at 525.
181. Id. at 526.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 527-34.
184. Id. at 515, 527-34 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens, & O'Connor, JJ.).
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this ruling. 18 5 He reasoned that enforcement of an NLRB order finding a breach of the duty to bargain "would run directly counter to the express provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and to the Code's overall effort to give a debtor-in-possession some flexibility and breathing space."186 According to
the majority,
the practical effect of the enforcement action would be to
require adherence to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. But the filing of the petition in bankruptcy means that the collective-bargaining agreement is
enforceable, and may never be enno longer immediately
7
forceable again.18
Justice Brennan dissented from this part of the majority
opinion.18

Writing for four Justices,

8

9

he professed not to

understand how the majority could accommodate the "special
nature" of the collective bargaining agreement when considering the proper standard for rejection on the one hand, but
ignore the same when considering the propriety of unilateral
conduct on the other.190 The majority, Justice Brennan
wrote, had decided to subordinate labor law to bankruptcy
law when it should have tried to resolve the "unavoidable
conflict" between the two statutory schemes by giving some
effect to both. 9' "One could as easily, and with as little justification, focus on the policies and provisions of the NLRA
alone and conclude that Congress must have intended that
section 8(d) remain applicable."' 92
Justice Brennan also doubted that rejecting the contract
before securing bankruptcy court approval was so vital to the
debtor's flexibility in getting reorganized that it trumped the
duty to bargain. 93 In most cases, he argued, the affected
union, already worried about impending job losses among its
185. Id. at 528. "Obviously if the [debtor-in-possession] were a wholly 'new
entity' it would be unnecessary for the Bankruptcy Code to allow it to reject
executory contracts, since it would not be bound by such contracts in the first
place." Id. With this, even the four dissenters agreed. See id. at 544 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 532.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 535 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
190. Id. at 541.
191. Id. at 540-41.
192. NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 541 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 550-51.
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membership, would have enough incentive to negotiate such
94
flexibility with the debtor.1
Organized labor immediately denounced Bildisco.'9 5
Due to a fortuitous combination of these protests, publicity
about the wave of bankruptcy court decisions granting contract rejections during the activity period, and the already
pending constitutional crisis in the bankruptcy courts that
had been created by the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,196
Congress reacted quickly.' 9 v The result, in what many observers considered to be record time, was the enactment of
section 1113 less than five months after Bildisco.195
B.

Structure of Section 1113

Congress reacted to Bildisco by passing a law "creat[ing]
an expedited form of collective bargaining with several safeguards designed to insure that employers did not use Chapter
1 99
11 as medicine to rid themselves of corporate indigestion."
Section 1113 codified, modified, and overruled parts of
Bildisco.
Section 1113 codified the unanimous portion of the opinion holding that a bankruptcy court considering rejection
should apply a more stringent test than business judgment,
be persuaded that the debtor has undertaken some effort to
negotiate a voluntary settlement, and be convinced that the
equities affecting all parties balance in favor of rejection
(steps four, six, and nine).2 ° °
194. Id. at 552.
195. See supra note 15 (citing authorities therein).
196. 458 U.S. 50 (1981) (holding subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts over certain civil claims, as established by Congress under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, violated judicial power clause of U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1). The MarathonPipe Line decision set off a congressional scramble
to fix the problem, which was not resolved until after Bildisco. See generally
Rosalind Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective BargainingAgreement: A
Brief Lesson in the Constitutional System of Checks and Balances, 58 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 293, 309-11 (1984).

197. For a summary of the confluence of these events, see generally HAGsupra note 3, at 59 & n.2, 68-71, 73-76 (citing authorities
therein).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
199. Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. UAW, 795 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 947 (1986).
200. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A), (b)(2), (c)(3) (1988).
GARD & PULLIAM,
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Section 1113 also modified the Court's adoption of the
Kevin Steel standard.20 Instead, Congress inserted the "necessary" requirement (step three).2 °2 Congress also modified
Bildisco by requiring the debtor to submit to the union a proposal (step one) based on information made available to the
union (steps two and five), 203 imposing a duty to meet and

confer in good faith (steps six and seven),2 4 and prohibiting
rejection unless the union refused the proposal without good
cause (step eight).205
Third, section 1113 overruled the five-Justice majority's
holding that a debtor could unilaterally reject first and seek
bankruptcy approval afterwards. 20

6

Self-help is now prohib-

ited; rejection is conditioned not only upon satisfying the
above requirements, 0 7 but also upon prior bankruptcy court
approval following notice and a hearing.20 8
The structure of section 1113 not only makes it unique
among federal labor legislation, but also provides the major
analytical tool of this study. Therefore, the statute requires
some detailed discussion.
1. The Nine Steps of American Provision
In American Provision,2 °9 Judge Kressel characterized
section 1113 as placing nine separate steps between the
debtor and a bankruptcy court order authorizing rejection.210
The debtor must climb each step in order to prevail.2 11
201. See id. § 1113(b)(1)(A).
202. See id.
203. See id. §§ 1113(b)(1)(A)-(B).
204. See id. § 1113(b)(2).
205. See id. § 1113(c)(2).
206. See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 3 at 80.
207. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(f).
208. See id. § 1113(d)(1).
209. 44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
210. Id. at 909. Judge Kressel was careful, however, to say that § 1113 "is
not a masterpiece of draftsmanship." Id. Numerous commentators have
agreed, and some have proposed extensive reforms. See, e.g., Marc S. Kirschner, et al., Tossing the Coin Under Section 1113: Heads or Tails, the Union
Wins, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1516, 1519 (1993).
211. At least one bankruptcy judge has analogized the collective bargaining
process under § 1113 to a "barrier" that must be "scaled" before rejection may
be granted. See In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 B.R. 460, 464 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1985) (citing STANLEY B. BERNSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AFTER THE AMENDMENT ACTS OF 1984 122 (1984)).
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(a) Step One: Proposal
Section 1113 requires that after filing for Chapter 11, but
before filing an application for rejection, the debtor must take
the first step toward getting negotiations under way. That
step is presenting to the union a proposal outlining modifications to the collective bargaining agreement.2 1 2 Although the
statute requires that the proposal meet the requirements set
forth below in steps two, three, and four,2 13 the first proposal
need not necessarily be the one that climbs those steps. If,
during the course of negotiations, the debtor makes other proposals, those will also be considered by the bankruptcy court.
So long as a satisfactory proposal is made "prior to the hearing," the bankruptcy court may grant rejection.2 14
(b) Step Two: Complete Information
The debtor's proposal must be more than an afterthought; it is supposed to be based on the most complete and
reliable information available. 2 15 Litigation focusing on this
step has been relatively rare, and the decisions interpreting it
are few.2 16 Judge Kressel, in American Provision, noted the
similarity of step two to step five but also explained the key
difference: the former instructs that the proposal be based on
certain information; the latter requires the debtor to provide
such information to the union.2 17
(c)

Step Three: Necessary Modifications

The "necessary" requirement actually appears twice in
the statute. The debtor's proposal must provide for "those
necessary modifications in the employees benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor."218 As one bankruptcy court stated, "[a] debtor can
212. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (1988).
213. Id.
214. Id. § 1113(c)(1). See also, e.g., In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 146 B.R.
920, 929 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in relevant part, New York Typographical
Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
215. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (1988).
216. See, e.g., In re American Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1984).
217. Id. at 909 & n.2.
218. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
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live on water alone for a short time but over the long haul it
needs food to sustain itself and retain its vigor."219
Exactly what "necessary" means has been the subject of
vigorous judicial and academic debate,22 ° although the nuances of that debate need not be repeated here. Suffice it to
say that the debate actually raises two separate questions.22 '
The first question is necessary for what: must the proposed
modifications ensure the complete rehabilitation of the
debtor, merely help the debtor avoid liquidation, or do something in between? Early during Chapter 11 proceedings,
when section 1113 applications are filed, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to know exactly what will ensure a successful
reorganization.
The second question is how necessary: must the debtor's
proposed modifications be essential to the reorganization,
merely helpful, or something in between? This inquiry is
complicated by the existence of section 1113(e), which explicitly permits interim modifications to the contract when "essential" to the continuation of the debtor's business.222 Presumably, if Congress had intended that the application for
rejection under section 1113(c) be granted only upon a showing that the proposed changes were "essential," it would have
used "essential" therein instead of twice using the word
"necessary."
The lower federal courts that have considered these
questions are divided between two leading cases: the Third
Circuit's 1986 decision in Wheeling-PittsburghSteel Corp. v.
United Steelworkers223 and the Second Circuit's 1987 decision
2 24
in Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation Co.

The Third Circuit's answer to necessary for what is the shortterm goal of avoiding liquidation; its answer to how necessary
is that which is essential to the continuation of the busi219. In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 B.R. 403, 418 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd, 78 B.R. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, New York Typographical Union
No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1078 (1989).
220. See supra note 36.
221. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 88 (2d
Cir. 1987); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d
1074, 1088 (3d Cir. 1986).
222. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (1988).
223. Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 791 F.2d at 1074.
224. Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 82.
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ness. 22 5 By contrast, the Second Circuit's answer to necessary for what is the long-term goal of increasing the chances
for successful rehabilitation; its answer to how necessary is
necessary, but not absolutely minimal. 22 6 The Tenth Circuit
has lined up behind Carey Transportation;227 the other circuits have yet to speak. So28 far, the Supreme Court has de2
clined to resolve the split.
(d)

Step Four: Fairand Equitable

The proposed modifications must assure "that all creditors, the debtor, and all affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably." 2 29 The debtor must "spread the burden of saving
the company to every constituency while ensuring that all
sacrifice to a similar degree." 230 This means that non-union
and union employees, labor and management, secured and
unsecured creditors, and owners and non-owners must each
contribute in some measure to the reorganization. 23 ' But it
does not mean that each constituency's contribution must
match every other constituency's contribution dollar-for-dollar.2 3 2 Instead, the focus is on whether the proposal "exacts
more of an economic tribute from [unionized] employees...
2 33
than from the debtor and from other creditors."
(e) Step Five: Necessary Information
The debtor must provide to the union such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.2 3 4 This
means sharing detailed financial data about the debtor's
business that in most circumstances is not required to be dis225. Wheeling-Pittsburgh,791 F.2d at 1074.
226. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.

1987).
227. See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 9 v. Mile Hi Metal Sys.,
Inc., 899 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1990).
228. See New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room,
Inc., 848 F.2d 345, 348-49 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989).

229. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (1988).
230. Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. UAW, 795 F.2d 265, 273 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 947 (1986).
231. See, e.g., In re Indiana Grocery Co., 138 B.R. 40,48-49 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
1990); In re Big Sky Transp. Co., 104 B.R. 333, 336-37 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989).

232.
Allied
233.
234.

See In re Walway Co., 69 B.R. 967, 974 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re
Delivery Sys. Co., 49 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
In re William P. Brogna & Co., 64 B.R. 390, 392 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986).
11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B) (1988).
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closed under the NLRA.2 35 Information providing only some
indication of the debtor's financial condition is not enough;
the debtor must provide "sufficient information to enable
[the] union to determine whether the specific concessions
sought ...

[are] reasonable or necessary."236

237
(f) Step Six: Meet and Confer

During the period between the making of a proposal and
the date of the hearing on the application for rejection, the
debtor has the duty to meet and confer with the union to at2 38 This is the "expetempt to reach a voluntary settlement.
2 39 referred to above. The
dited form of collective bargaining"
requirement reflects Congress's preference for private solu240 As Chief Judge
tions over judicially imposed resolutions.
Joseph L. Cosetti of the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania has stated: "Labor negotiations occur at the bargaining table. Courts clearly do
not settle labor disputes by judicial process ....

At best, a

"241
motion to reject the contract is an invitation to bargain.

235. See NRLB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956).
236. In re George Cindrich Gen'l Contracting, Inc., 130 B.R. 20, 23 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1991).
237. American Provision actually states that the "confer" part of this step
belongs in step seven along with the good-faith requirement. In re American
Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). But the study moved
"confer" to step six along with "meet" because, in the parlance of the duty to
bargain familiar to labor attorneys outside Chapter 11, the terms "meet and
confer" are so interdependent as to mean little unless they are considered
together. See, e.g., NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988) ("[T]o bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation . . . to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith . . . ."). In any event, the move does

not alter the meaning of step seven, for Judge Kressel's focus there was on
whether the debtor's bargaining posture was sincere or merely perfunctory.
American Provision, 44 B.R. at 911.
238. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (1988).
239. See Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. UAW, 795 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 947 (1986).
240. See, e.g., In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. 363, 373 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1990) (opining that the debtor "should continue labor negotiations and
business operations as a union employer"); In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52
B.R. 797, 802 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (recessing the rejection hearing for further negotiations).
241. Joseph L. Cosetti & Stanley A. Kirshenbaum, Rejecting Collective BargainingAgreements Under Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code-JudicialPrecision or Economic Reality?, 26 DuQ. L. REv. 181, 208 (1987).

872

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

(g) Step Seven: Good Faith
The debtor must meet and confer with the union regarding the proposal in good faith.2 42 Few cases have attempted
to clarify what this step means. Most discuss what it does not
mean. 243 The consensus is that the term does not mean here
what it does under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA: the duty to
bargain in good faith to impasse.244 Congress, according to
the consensus, intended "good faith" to be interpreted by the
bankruptcy courts "in a nontechnical fashion." 245 The duty is

satisfied if the debtor "has seriously attempted to negotiate
reasonable modifications in the existing collective bargaining
agreement with the union prior to the rejection hearing. "246
(h) Step Eight: Good Cause Refusal
If the debtor's proposal satisfies the foregoing steps, then
the bankruptcy court may authorize rejection if the union has
refused to accept the proposal without good cause.247 This is
not the same as saying that the union has acted in bad faith.
In fact, according to one bankruptcy court,
the Union may often have a principled reason for deciding
to reject the debtor's proposal .... However, the [bank-

ruptcy] court must review the Union's rejection utilizing
an objective standard which narrowly construes the
phrase "without good cause" in light of the main purpose
reorganization of financially disof Chapter 11, namely
248
tressed businesses.

(i) Step Nine: Balance of Equities
Finally, the balance of equities must "clearly" favor rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.2 4 9 Much of step
242. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (1988).
243. See infra note 244.
244. See, e.g., In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 801 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1985); In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 50 B.R. 969, 976
(Bankr. W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 52 B.R. 997 (W.D. Pa. 1985), vacated and remanded,
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir.
1986).
245. Kentucky Truck Sales, 52 B.R. at 801.
246. Id. See also In re American Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1984) (debtor's participation in only one meeting is "perfunctory," and
therefore not in good faith).
247. 11 U.S.C § 1113(c)(2) (1993).
248. In re Salt Creek Freightways, Inc. (Salt Creek 11), 47 B.R. 835, 840
(Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
249. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (1988).
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25 ° Citing
nine duplicates the ground covered by step four.
Bildisco, bankruptcy courts have construed this requirement
to mean not a "freewheeling consideration of every conceivable equity, but rather only how the equities relate to the success of the reorganization."251 Such equities include the likelihood and consequences of liquidation for the debtor absent
rejection, the reduced value of creditors' claims, the hardship
rejection would work upon employees, and the hardships
faced by other affected parties.252

2. How the Nine Steps Make Section 1113 Unique
The nine steps to rejection of American Provision make
section 1113 a unique, if not revolutionary, piece of labor legislation 253 in three respects. First, the statute stirs an unprecedented admixture of substantive as well as procedural
elements into the bargaining process. Steps three, four,
eight, and nine each require the debtor to establish, to the
satisfaction of a federal bankruptcy judge, that his proposal
has merit. 25 4 These steps make section 1113 the only federal

labor law governing the private sector that allows the government to decide whether the debtor's bargaining proposals are
good enough to be adopted by the union. For example, in step
three, rejection is conditioned on the debtor's establishing to
the satisfaction of a bankruptcy judge that his proposed
changes are "necessary" to permit the debtor's reorganization.255 By contrast, under the NLRA, the government is
never allowed to pass upon the merits of the employer's
proposals, or to state whether the union is justified in refusing them.256 Under limited circumstances, the NLRB may
250. Id. § 1113(b)(1)(A).
251. In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 805 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1985) (quoting with approval NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527
(1984)).
252. Id. at 806; accord In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 146 B.R. 920, 933
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in relevantpart, New York Typographical Union No. 6
v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in relevant part,
981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Sierra Steel Corp., 88 B.R. 337, 341-43 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1988).
253. Section 1113 is federal labor law, even though it amends the Bankruptcy Code rather than the NLRA.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 218-233, 247-252.
255. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (1988).
256. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988) ("[The] obligation [to bargain
collectively] does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
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supervise the process, but not the product, of collective
bargaining.2 5 7
Second, the statute redefines the once-settled meaning of
the employer's duty to bargain. Although steps one, two, five,
six, and seven certainly impose a duty to bargain with language borrowed from the traditional law of collective bargaining procedure,2 58 the virtually identical terms in the Bankruptcy Code do not mean what they do in the NLRA. 2 59 The
section 1113 duty to bargain is narrow and truncated. Under
section 1113, once the debtor-employer's application to reject
has been filed, bargaining must take place within a brief,
statutorily defined period of time, whose length and duration
is controlled primarily by the employer.2 6 ° If the time expires
making of a concession."). See also, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99,
107 (1970); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962).
257. One proponent of the original Wagner Act expressed the limits of the
law in this manner:
When employees have chosen their organization, when they have
elected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort
them to the door of the employer and say, "Here they are, the legal
representatives of your employees." What happens behind that door is
not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.
79 CONG. REC. 7660 (1935) (statement of Sen. Walsh). But see Archibald Cox &
John T. Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargainingby the NationalLabor Relations Board, 63 HIARv. L. REV. 389 (1950) (discussing how Board developed the
law of mandatory bargaining subjects, which law calls for a measure of inquiry
into what goes on behind "that door").
258. Compare,e.g., NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988) ("[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith. . . .") with Bankruptcy Code § 1113(b)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (1988)
("[T]he trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representative to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications .. . ").
259. The legislative history seems to support this interpretation. See, e.g.,
130 CONG. REC. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond)
("[The bargaining requirement] is obviously not intended to import traditional
labor law concepts into a bankruptcy forum or to turn bankruptcy courts into a
version of the National Labor Relations Board."). In any event, the few courts
that have considered the matter agree. See, e.g., Century Brass Prods., Inc. v.
UAW, 795 F.2d 265, 273 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986). So have
commentators. See, e.g., Richard H. Gibson, The New Law on Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements in Chapter 11: An Analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 1113,
58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 329 (1984). But see Keating, supra note 36, at 548
(claiming rule under NLRA requiring notice and bargaining is "fairly similar"
to the standard under § 1113).
260. Upon the filing of an application for rejection under § 1113(c), the bankruptcy court is required to schedule a hearing not later than 14 days after the
filing date. Bankruptcy Code § 1113(d)(1). All interested parties, including the
union, may appear and be heard. Id. Adequate notice must be provided to
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before the union is satisfied with the product of negotiations,
the debtor may be permitted to implement his proposal anyway-even if impasse, the traditional point at which the duty
to bargain is suspended under the NLRA, has not yet been
reached. 26 1 By contrast, the NLRA neither gives the em-

ployer such control nor imposes firm limits on the duration of
negotiations.262
Finally, section 1113 transfers responsibility for regulating collective bargaining, at least between Chapter 11 employers and their unions, from a forum of experts in labor relations (the NLRB) to a forum of nonexperts (the federal
bankruptcy courts). 263 Thus the statute, following Bildisco,
has effectively codified the elimination of a whole class of
cases over which the NLRB reserved its exclusive unfair labor practice jurisdiction for nearly fifty years.264
These unique aspects of section 1113 are bound to affect
collective bargaining during Chapter 11 proceedings. This
article describes why this is occurring.
III. THE METHODOLOGY
A. Some Thoughts About Empiricism and Legal
Scholarship
The goal of the following study was to collect answers to
a series of simple questions: How do collective bargaining
agreements actually fare when presented to bankruptcy
judges for rejection under section 1113? Are contracts usually rejected or not? Are they rejected more often today than
these parties at least 10 days before the hearing. Id.

The bankruptcy court

may extend the time for commencing the hearing for a period not to exceed 7
days when justice so requires, or for a longer period by mutual agreement of the

employer and union. Id. A ruling on the application is required within 30 days

of the commencement of the hearing, unless the employer and union agree

otherwise. Id. If the bankruptcy court fails to rule within 30 days or, when
applicable, the time mutually agreed to, then the employer may terminate or

alter any provisions of the contract pending such ruling. Id. § 1113(d)(2).
Although the reported decisions show that as many as six months may elapse

between the employer's first proposal and the first hearing date, the statute, if

adhered to strictly by an employer-debtor, can produce a result in as few as 24
days. See, e.g., In re United Press Int'l, Inc., 134 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991).

261. But see NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1962); Taft Broadcasting
Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967).

262. For a discussion of the law of"impasse," see 1 CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 691-99 (3d ed. 1992).
263. See infra text accompanying notes 462-466.
264. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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they were before the statute was enacted? Which, if any, of
the statute's nine steps are most important in the bankruptcy
judge's decision-making calculus, and how do they affect the
likelihood of rejection?
Section 1113 is an ideal vehicle for undertaking a modest
empirical study of such questions.26 5 There is no problem deciding when to begin the study; it begins with the July 10,
1984 effective date of the statute.2 6 6 There is no problem
finding a suitable control group; we have the considerable
body of case law relating to pre-section 1113 rejections under
section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and section 313(1) of
the old Bankruptcy Act. 26 7 There is no problem identifying a
manipulated variable; we have the enactment of section 1113
itself, which, as we have seen, breaks sharply with prior law
in its nine-step treatment of executory labor contracts under
bankruptcy law and the collective bargaining process under
labor law. 268 And finally, there is (or should be) no problem
collecting sufficient data; we have almost ten years of bankruptcy court decisions interpreting and applying section 1113
2 69
to applications to reject collective bargaining agreements.
Accordingly, this article has left to other commentators
any observations and conclusions about section 1113 using
the more traditional tools of legal scholarship.2 7 ° Such methods are primarily three: surveying the "major" reported appellate decisions; surveying a handful of interesting, but perhaps non-representative, reported bankruptcy court
decisions; and attempting to divine the meaning of various
words or phrases in the statute by looking at Congress's "intent." Each of these time-honored methods has a normative
element-that is, it assumes there is a "right" answer, result,
or interpretation, and that the goal of scholarship is to figure
out what such answer, result, or interpretation ought to be.
By contrast, this article tries to take an empirical approach. It assumes that surveys and assays at legislative intent, while having their place, often fail because we need to
265. For a discussion of empirical scholarship in bankruptcy law, see generally Teresa A. Sullivan, et. al., The Use of Empirical Datain FormulatingBankruptcy Policy, 50 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 195 (1987).
266. See supra note 2.
267. See infra app. D.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 253-264.
269. See infra apps. B-C.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.

1994] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN BANKRUPTCY 877
know where we have been before we can decide where we
should be going. Statutes do not interpret themselves. They
have no life until judges apply them to live controversies. At
some point after a statute's enactment, how it was supposed
to be interpreted, or what the collective conscience of Congress intended it to mean, is less relevant than how, in fact,
the courts are applying it in actual cases. If we first draw an
accurate baseline depicting what bankruptcy judges are actually doing with section 1113 applications, we will then be
positioned to criticize their work, and hence, the effectiveness
of the statute. That is the object here.
The traditional tools of legal scholarship are particularly
inadequate with regard to section 1113. First, like most
surveys, the survey literature on section 1113 is based on
non-representative data. Try as they may, commentators
cannot purport to say what courts as a group are doing in an
area of law, because the survey method rarely bases its conclusions on either a scientific sample of the universe of relevant cases, or the universe itself. Without this most basic element of rigor, we can have little confidence in making
generalized statements about what the cases seem to hold.
Second, the traditional attempt to divine the "intent" of
Congress is particularly useless here. Under the best of circumstances, decoding legislative intent is difficult.271 But it
is irrelevant, if not impossible, in the matter of section 1113,
which for purposes of this inquiry has no legislative history.
The absence of committee reports from either chamber of the
legislative branch eliminates the only truly useful divining
rod of legislative intent. 2
Thus, the focus of this study is on what bankruptcy
courts are really doing, not what they should be doing. The
article reviews all reported bankruptcy court decisions on applications to reject collective bargaining agreements under
section 1113, with candid acknowledgment of the limits such
271. Which may explain why, of late, the Supreme Court has focused on the
"plain meaning" doctrine when interpreting statutes, at least on a selective basis. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "LitigationExplosion": The
Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV.
413, 425-31 (1993).
272. See Charnov, supra note 21, at 1002. See also Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 9 v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 899 F.2d 887, 895 (10th Cir.
1990) (Seymour, J., dissenting).
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a sample may contain.2 7 3 The hope is that this sample is representative of-if not constitutive of-the universe of decision-making at the ground level of the Chapter 11 process regarding the fate of collective bargaining agreements under
section 1113. The more that the data studied reflect the universe of all decisions under section 1113, the more confidence
we may have in the answers offered to the questions posed
above-and, in turn, our praise or criticism of section 1113.
A cautionary note is in order. Although this article is
more empirical than normative, it is not designed to be the
definitive scientific statement on section 1113. The tools of
the scientific method have their limits everywhere, but especially here as applied by an author who is trained in the social rather than the physical sciences. For that reason, the
article relies on some simple calculations that anyone so inclined could perform to measure how the statute is working.17 Indeed, to those more rigorously trained, these calculations may seem simplistic. Nevertheless, they are an
important first step in an effort to study the processes of the
law as they actually operate, rather than as how we might
believe them to operate.
B. How the Study Was Conducted
2 75
The study examined every bankruptcy court decision
reported between July 10, 1984 and July 10, 1993 in which
the debtor-employer filed an application for relief from the
obligations of a collective bargaining agreement under section 1113.276
273. See infra text accompanying notes 411-424. Legal scholars too often
omit candid discussion of the limits of their empirical work. See, e.g., Christopher D. Cameron, How the "Languageof the Law" Limited the American Labor
Movement, 25 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1141, 1150-51 n.43 (1992); Lee E. Teitelbaum,
An Overview of Law and Social Research,35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 465, 476-77 (1985).
274. This approach has worked well for other labor-related scholarship. See,
e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769, 1786 (1983).
275. The narrower term "decision," rather than the broader term "case," was
used by the study to convey that an employer's § 1113 application was actually
presented to and usually ruled upon by the bankruptcy court. Similarly, the
broader term "proceeding," rather than the narrower term "case," was used to
refer to each petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 filed by a debtoremployer.
276. Decisions involving applications to reject individual employment agreements, agreements between employers and groups of independent contractors,
and other employment-related executory contracts, were not analyzed mainly
because § 1113 does not apply to such arrangements. See, e.g., In re Metro
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For purposes of the study, the term "reported," when
used in referring to reported bankruptcy court decisions, has
two dimensions. 7 First, it includes all section 1113 bankruptcy court decisions published or otherwise made available
2
through the facilities of the Bureau of National Affairs,28 °
Commerce Clearing House, 9 Matthew Bender Company,28 2
Mead Data Corporation,28 1 and West Publishing Company.
It was assumed that West's Bankruptcy Reporter was the
most widely relied-upon reporting service. Consequently, the
study examined the version of every decision reported there
and used the other services to examine additional decisions
not reported by West. Second, "reported" includes all un-reported bankruptcy court decisions for which there were related reported appellate decisions (by district courts, bankruptcy appellate panels, and circuit courts of appeal, where
applicable) providing significant data about what happened
below when the bankruptcy court was presented with a section 1113 application.
During the study period, bankruptcy courts issued fortysix reported decisions in which the debtor filed at least one
application to reject under section 1113(c), one application for
283 Of these deciinterim relief under section 1113(e), or both.
sions, thirty-eight considered at least one section 1113(c) application filed by a debtor to reject a collective bargaining
agreement. 2 4 These thirty-eight section 1113(c) decisions

Transp. Co., 87 B.R. 338, 344 & n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (agreements between committee of independent drivers and debtor taxi firm, though executory, were not collective bargaining agreements).
277. Although conducting empirical research based only on reported decisions is somewhat unusual, it is by no means without precedent. See, e.g., WiLLIAM E. FORBATH, LAw AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
(1991) (studying reported decisions on challenges to labor protective legislation
and anti-strike and boycott injunctions).
278. Including the Labor Relations Reference Manual and Bankruptcy Court
Decisions.
279. Including Labor Cases and Bankruptcy Law Reports.
280. Including Collier's Bankruptcy Cases.
281. Including the computerized service LEXIS.
282. Including the Bankruptcy Reporter and the computerized service
WESTLAW.
283. See infra apps. B & C.
284. See infra app. B. In 20 of the 46 decisions, there was an overlap in
which the debtor filed both at least one application for interim relief from the
collective bargaining agreement under § 1113(e) and at least one application for
permanent rejection of the contract under § 1113(c). See infra note 317 & app.
C.
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form the crux of the study. Each of the thirty-eight was inventoried for data tending to show not only the fate of the
section 1113(c) application, but also the factors that could
have influenced the decision.
Each inventory was conducted by at least two researchers,2 8 5 who recorded short answers to twenty-eight separate
questions about each decision on an inventory sheet.28 6 The
questions sought data concerning four areas: (1) general information, (2) information about the nine steps to rejection
under American Provision, (3) information about bargaining
during bankruptcy proceedings, and (4) other information.
1. General Information
The study inventoried three types of general information
about each decision. First, the study identified the most basic
information: the name of the case and its citation; the docket
number; the identity of the bankruptcy judge who issued the
decision; the particular circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals having supervisorial jurisdiction over the bankruptcy court; the date that the Chapter 11 petition was filed;
and whether a section 1113(c) application had been filed by
the debtor.28 7
Next, the study inventoried pertinent data about the various applications to reject that might be filed in a given proceeding: the reported section 1113(c) application; any prior
section 1113(c) applications; and any prior or pending section
1113(e) applications for interim relief.2 8 For each such application, the filing date, hearing dates, decision date, outcome, and existence or non-existence of opposition to the application were recorded.289
Finally, the study inventoried information about the fate
of the bankruptcy court's decision on appeal, if any, to the
285. Each answer on each inventory sheet was recorded after the decision
had been carefully reviewed by both the author and at least one research assistant. In most cases, the initial review was by a research assistant, whose work
was reviewed for accuracy by the author.
286. For a sample inventory sheet, see infra app. A. For the actual data, see
Cameron Labor/Bankruptcy Project, First Revised Case Inventory Sheet Nos.
1-38 (Apr.-Aug. 1993) (on file with author).
287. See infra app. A (questions 1-7).
288. Although some key data were recorded about applications for interim
relief, for the most part § 1113(e) was not the focus of the study. See infra text
accompanying notes 353-367.
289. See infra app. A (questions 8 through 10).
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district court, bankruptcy appellate panel, or circuit court of
appeals, and miscellaneous issues, including but not limited
to the priority treatment of union wage and benefit claims
and motions to reject the obligation to pay health and welfare
benefits under section 1114.290

2. American Provision Information
The singular contribution of the case law to the organization of the study is Judge Kressel's opinion in American Provision,29 1 which characterizes section 1113 as placing nine

separate analytical steps between the debtor and a bankruptcy court order approving rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. Most bankruptcy judges now refer specifically to the nine steps of American Provision in their
reported decisions.292 Accordingly, the study inventoried
every reported section 1113(c) decision by the bankruptcy
courts for the relative importance that each of American Provision's nine steps seemed to play in the decision-making
process.293
The object of the study was to measure the decision-makaping process at the bankruptcy court level; accordingly,
294 and
panel,
peals to the district court, bankruptcy appellate
circuit courts of appeals were not separately inventoried.
290. See id. (questions 11 and 12). Neither the priority of general union
claims, see Bankruptcy Code § 507(a), 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1988) nor the treatment of employer obligations to pay pension and welfare benefits during reorganizations, see Retiree Benefits Protection Act of 1988, P.L. 100-224, § 2(a), 102
Stat. 610 (June 16, 1988), codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988), were examined in
this study.
291. 44 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
292. The nine steps of American Provisionwere specifically referred to by the
bankruptcy court in 26 of 38 (68.4%) reported decisions. But see In re Royal
Composing Room, Inc., 62 Bankr. 403, 406 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("This court
eschews the talismanic nine-step analysis of Bankruptcy Code § 1113 . . ."),
aff'd on other grounds, 78 Bankr. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989). Even when the bankruptcy court did
not refer specifically to American Provision, however, its decision was susceptible to examination in terms of the nine steps. See, e.g., In re Pierce Terminal
Warehouse, Inc., 133 Bankr. 639, 646 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1991).
293. See infra app. B (questions 14 and 15).
294. To date, only two circuits have established bankruptcy appellate panels.
See Gordon Bermant & Judy Beckner Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels:The
Ninth Circuit'sExperience, 21 ARIz. ST. L.J. 181, 187 (1989), but no such panel
has reported an appeal from a ruling on a section 1113(c) application. See app.
A. For a discussion of how the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provides for
potentially three separate avenues of appeal, see Judy Beckner Sloan, Appellate
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This was because, appeals notwithstanding, the bankruptcy
judge has the final word on almost every discrete issue ruled
upon during a Chapter 11 proceeding, including the section
1113(c) application.2 9 5 Appeals, if any, and their respective
impacts on the outcomes were recorded solely for the purpose
of indicating whether the bankruptcy judge's ruling survived
the appeal.
Each American Provision step suggests a discrete factor
that could be important in the bankruptcy judge's calculus
when deciding whether to grant or deny a section 1113(c) application. Indeed, the collective existence of these steps suggests a certain predictive power. Assume for the moment
(Part IV will test this assumption) that some steps are more
determinative of the fate of a section 1113(c) application than
others-that is, a few of these steps are more likely to trip up
the debtor, thereby affecting the decision to grant or deny rejection. Recall also that, should the debtor fail to climb any
one of the nine steps, rejection is not to be granted. 29 6 If
these things are true, the likely outcome of any future section
1113(c) application should be foreseeable given advance information about the content of the debtor's proposal and the bargaining history of the parties.
For example, if most of the commentators are correct,
then bankruptcy courts consider the "necessary" requirement
of step three to be the most important step in any section
1113(c) inquiry. 29 7 A discrete analysis of whether the
debtor's proposal is necessary to permit his reorganization
could be expected to provide the strongest single predictor of
success or failure for the application as a whole. In other
words, if the debtor cannot persuade the bankruptcy judge
that his proposal is necessary to permit reorganization, then
he might as well pack his litigation bags and go home, because he is going to lose no matter how well he can climb the
other steps. Conversely, if the debtor's arguments have the
Jurisdictionof Interlocutory Appeals in Bankruptcy 28 U.S.C. Section 158(d): A
Case of Lapsus Calami, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 265, 272-73 (1991).
295. From the 38 decisions studied, only twelve appeals were reported. Of
the twelve appeals, only six ultimately produced reversals of the bankruptcy
court's decision. In other words, the rate at which bankruptcy judges' decisions
on § 1113(c) applications are reversed is 15.8%-but the rate at which their
decisions stand, whether appealed or not, is a remarkable 84.2%.
296. See supra text accompanying note 211.
297. See supra note 36.
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potential to persuade the bankruptcy judge as to necessity,
then the union opposing the application must be wary of
wasting its efforts by attacking the debtor's attempt to climb
the remaining eight steps, instead of focusing its attack on
step three. Should "necessity" be what the bankruptcy judge
cares for most, any union would be well advised to concentrate its legal firepower on rebutting, if not anticipating, the
debtor's evidence of necessity.
Even if the commentators are wrong about the importance of step three, however, there may be other discrete
steps-perhaps even groups of steps-in which repose the
type of predictive power discussed above. But only by first
analyzing each discrete step for its relative importance to
each section 1113(c) application can we hope to forecast accurately the outcome of such applications.
Thus, the nine steps of American Provision provided the
study with its central analytical tool. Each decision was inventoried for the importance attached to each step. A simple
rating device was used. The researcher was instructed to record the data by imagining the following five-point spectrum:
2

1

3

---------------------------------------------unimportant

somewhat
unimportant

maybe/maybe
not important

4

5

somewhat
important

important

0-------------------

The researcher was instructed to indicate the degree of
importance placed on each step in the reported opinion by recording a rating of one (unimportant), two (somewhat unimportant), three (maybe/maybe not important), four (somewhat important), or five (important). No steps were to be left
unrated. If the researcher could not tell exactly how important the step was in the reported decision, he or she was instructed to298record a rating of three (maybe/maybe not
important).
The American Provision steps were rated in two ways.
First, the importance of the step from the parties' point of
view was recorded.2 99 That is, to the extent that there was a
controversy as to whether a particular step had been climbed
satisfactorily, the study recorded the relative importance that
Robins and Laura Ker298. Memorandum from Chris Cameron to Corey
schenbaum (Apr. 5, 1993) (on file with author).
299. Id. See also infra app. A (question 14).
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the step seemed to play in how the application was contested.
On the inventory sheet, this was noted as an inquiry into
"contested factors,"3 °° because the study recorded the importance of the step as contested by the union and the debtor.3 0 1
Second, the importance of the step from the bankruptcy
judge's point of view was recorded.30 2 That is, irrespective of
whether and to what degree the parties thought they were
fighting over a given step, the study attempted to take the
long view and ascertain what the bankruptcy judge actually
had considered in deciding the application. On the inventory
sheet, this was noted as an inquiry into "overall factors ,"33
because the study recorded the importance of the step from
the overall standpoint of the neutral officer assigned to hear
the application. Although in some decisions the bankruptcy
judge appeared to attach to each step the same degree of importance that the parties did, 0 4 in others the bankruptcy
judge's view differed markedly from those of the parties.3 5
In recording the relative importance of each step, the
study was initially unconcerned with whether the bankruptcy court ruled for or against the debtor-applicant. It was
assumed that the relationship, if any, between the importance of a given step and the outcome could be analyzed once
a baseline describing the relative importance of all steps was
established.
3.

Information About BargainingDuring Bankruptcy

The study inventoried more specific information about
the bankruptcy court's evaluation of both the content and the
process of collective bargaining negotiations between the parties at each step in the climb.3 0 6 For each decision, data were
300. See infra app. A (question 15).
301. See, e.g., In re Sun Glo Coal Co., 144 Bankr. 58, 62 (Bankr. E.D. Ky.
1992) (holding that union did not contest employer's showing as to steps one,
two, five and six; union raised but did not present evidence regarding step
seven; remaining contested steps were three, four, eight and nine).
302. See Memorandum from Chris Cameron to Corey Robins and Laura Kerschenbaum (Apr. 5, 1993) (on file with author).
303. See infra app. A (question 15).
304. See, e.g., In re George Cindrich Gen'l Contracting, Inc., 130 Bankr. 20
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991). See also Cameron Labor/Bankruptcy Project, First Revised Case Inventory Sheet No. 16 (Apr. 16, 1993) (on file with author).
305. See, e.g., In re Valley Kitchens, Inc., 52 Bankr. 493 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985). See also Cameron Labor/Bankruptcy Project, First Revised Inventory
Sheet No. 2 (Apr. 6, 1993) (on file with author).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 209-211.
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recorded about the format and number of proposals made by
the debtor; the content of proposed modifications to the collective bargaining agreement sought by the debtor; the union's
response; the number of meet-and-confer sessions held; the
type and quality of information provided by the debtor to the
union; the "necessariness" of the debtor's proposal; the bankruptcy court's evaluation of how fairly and equitably the proposal treated the debtor, the union, and other creditors;
whether the union had good cause for refusing the proposal;
3 °7
and whether the balance of equities favored rejection.
Of particular interest were data collected about the nature of the bargaining and the "necessariness" of the debtor's
proposal. As to the former, the study sought to record the
total number of employer-union "meet-and-confer" sessions:
of these, the number engaged in before the Chapter 11 filing;
the number of days from the date of the debtor's first proposal
to the date of the bankruptcy court's first hearing on the section 1113(c) application; whether the debtor had conferred in
good faith; and whether the union had refused to meet and
confer at all. As to the last, the study sought to record
whether the bankruptcy court had defined "necessary" as
meaning either essential (the standard prevailing in the

Third Circuit 30 8 ) or non-essential (the standard prevailing in
3 10 Circuits). 3 1 ' In either case, the
the Second 30 9 and Tenth
2

study recorded whether such standard had been satisfied.
In a number of decisions, some or all data about bargaining during the bankruptcy was either not available or not reported by the bankruptcy court in its decision. For those
cases, the researcher was instructed to record nothing and instead to leave the inventory sheet blank.

307. See infra app. A (questions 16 through 23).
308. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d
1074, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1986).
309. See New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room,
Inc., 848 F.2d 345, 350 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989); Truck
Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., 816 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1987).
310. See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 9 v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc.,
899 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1990).
311. For a discussion of the split of authority, see supra text accompanying
notes 218-228.
312. See infra app. A (questions 18 and 20).
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4. Other Information
The study recorded miscellaneous data about each decision, including the type of industry and craft or class of workers involved; the number of workers affected by the section
1113(c) application;3 13 whether a plan of reorganization had
been filed, and if so, whether it had been confirmed by the
bankruptcy court; whether the application had been settled
rather than adjudicated; the identity of counsel for the parties in interest; and the identity of the researchers conducting
the inventory and the date thereof.314
In many decisions, some or all miscellaneous data was
either not available or not reported by the bankruptcy court.
It was rare, for example, to find reported information about
settlements and confirmed plans of reorganization.3 1 5 This

was expected due to the early stage during Chapter 11 proceedings at which section 1113(c) applications are typically
filed. For all such decisions, the researcher was instructed to
record nothing and instead to leave the inventory sheet
blank.
IV.

THE RESULTS

A. General Information
The study examined forty-six reported bankruptcy court
decisions in which a debtor filed at least one section 1113 application: thirty-eight decisions in which complete contract
rejection was sought under section 1113(c),31 6 and twenty in
which interim modification of the contract was sought under
section 1113(e).317
313. These data were recorded on the inventory sheet in the space provided
for data about the industry and craft or class of workers involved because no
separate space had been allocated on the form. See app. A (question 24).
314. See infra app. A (questions 24 through 28).
315. See, e.g., In re Apple Tree Mkt., Inc., 155 B.R. 431 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.

1993).
316. See infra app. B.
317. See infra app. C. There was an overlap of 12 reported decisions in
which a bankruptcy court was presented with separate applications for both
rejection under § 1113(c) and interim relief under § 1113(e). See, e.g., In re

Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 146 B.R. 920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Sun Glo

Coal Co., 144 B.R. 50 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992); In re Blue Diamond Coal Co.
(Blue Diamond 1), 147 B.R. 720 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992), later proceeding,In
re Blue Diamond Coal Co. (Blue Diamond 11), 131 B.R. 633 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1991), aff'd mem., Civ. No. 3-91-0741 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 20, 1992) appeal docketed, No. 92-5747 (6th Cir. 1992); In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R.

363 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Chas. P. Young Co., 111 B.R. 410 (Bankr.
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Applications for rejection rather than modification of collective bargaining agreements draw more critical fire,31 so
the study focused on the thirty-eight decisions under section
1113(c). They affected over 10,000 bargaining unit employees
in all major industries except agriculture. 3 19

The fifteen

debtor-employers engaged in the service industries, represented here by firms in air transportation, ground transportation, and retail sales, accounted for nearly forty percent of
the decisions.32 0 By contrast, six construction and five manufacturing debtor-employers accounted for roughly sixteen and
thirteen percent of the decisions, respectively.32 1 Figure 1 describes the industries studied in detail.

S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Big Sky Transp. Co., 104 B.R. 333 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989);
In re Amherst Sparkle Mkt., Inc., 75 B.R. 847 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re
Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 B.R. 403 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 78 B.R.
671 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078
(1989); In re Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc., Case No. S-85-01113, slip op.
(Bankr. D. Nev. June 9, 1986) (Jones, J.), aff'd, Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc.
v. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, 78 B.R. 575 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987),
appeal dismissed, 872 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Sullivan Motor Delivery,
Inc., 56 B.R. 28 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985); In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 51 B.R.
509 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985), related appeal, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n,
Local No. 9 v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 67 B.R. 114 (D. Colo. 1986), vacated and
remanded, 899 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Salt Creek Freightways, Inc.
(Salt Creek 1), 46 B.R. 347 (Bankr. D. Wyo.), laterproceeding,In re Salt Creek
Freightways, Inc., (Salt Creek II), 47 B.R. 835 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
318. See supra note 35 (citing critical commentary).
319. Although the actual total number of bargaining unit employees affected
by all § 1113(c) applications studied was at least 10,843, this finding must be
viewed with caution. First, data about the number of bargaining unit employees affected was available in only half the decisions studied. See Cameron Labor/Bankruptcy Project Inventory Sheet Nos. 3, 4, 8-9, 14, 18, 19-21, 24-25, 28,
30-34, 38 (1993) (on file with author). Second, the tremendous range in the
data, even where available, makes it difficult to generalize about the number of
affected employees per decision. Compare, e.g., In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp., 50 B.R. 969 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985) (8,500 employees), aff'd, 52 B.R. 997
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985), vacated and remanded, Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986), with, e.g., In re
Pierce Terminal Warehouse, Inc., 133 B.R. 639 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1991) (2
employees).
320. See fig. 1.
321. Id.
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FIGURE 1
INDUSTRIES AFFECTED BY REJECTION APPLICATIONS
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Perhaps a better measure of which sector of the economy
was most affected by section 1113 is the identity of the international labor organization with which the local union opposing the section 1113(c) motion was affiliated. 2 2 In at least a
dozen decisions-nearly one-third of the total-a local affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
America's union of truck drivers, made an appearance opposing a section 1113(c) application.32 3 No other international
322. In most, but not all, organized workplaces an "international" charters
local unions representing workers in the same general trade, craft, or class. A
chartered "local" is then considered to be affiliated with the international, and
thereby agrees to be governed by the constitution and by-laws laid down by the
international.
323. See fig. 2.

1994] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN BANKRUPTCY 889
union came close to this number. These decisions occurred
mostly in Chapter 11 proceedings filed by interstate ground
transportation firms, 24 whose declining fortunes in the years
since Congress deregulated the industry in 1978 have coincided closely with the loss of membership in Teamster-affiliated trucking locals during the same period.325 Figure 2
describes the representation of international labor organizations in more detail.

324. Nine of the 38 decisions studied-nearly one-fourth-fit this category.
325. See, e.g., Tim W. Ferguson, DeregulationDelivers the Goods, WALL ST.
J., June 29, 1993, at A15 (Teamsters' truck driver membership "is down to
about 5% of total commercial drivers in the U.S. after a loss of at least 100,000
in the 1980's.").
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FIGURE 2
AFFECTED UNIONS BY INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATION
(PERCENTAGE) 1984-1993
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Close to two-thirds of the decisions were reported by
bankruptcy courts in the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, 2 6 which may reflect the financial distress suffered by
residents of the industrial Midwest and Northeast during the
1980's.32' By contrast, no section 1113(c) decisions at all
were reported by bankruptcy courts in the First, Fourth, or
District of Columbia Circuits during the study period. Figure
326. See fig. 3.
327. The busiest bankruptcy courts were in the Northern District of Ohio
and the Southern District of New York, each of which reported four decisions on
§ 1113(c) applications.
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3 describes the geographical distribution of the decisions in
more detail.
FIGURE

3

REJECTION DECISIONS BY CIRCUIT AREA

(NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE)
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The timing of section 1113(c) decisions seemed to be distributed randomly throughout the study period. Although
the thirteen decisions issued in 1985 were more than in any
other year,3 28 four of them were issued in Chapter 11 proceedings that were originally filed in 1984.329 Figure 4 describes the timing of these decisions in more detail.

328. See fig. 4.

329. Id.
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FIGURE 4
TIMING OF REJECTION APPLICATION DECISIONS By CHAPTER
11 AND DECISION DATES 1984-1993
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B. How the Three Hypotheses Fared
1. Hypothesis #1: Fewer Collective Bargaining
Agreements Are Rejected Now Than Before
Section 1113 Was Enacted
Hypothesis #1 presented the opportunity to study
whether section 1113 is accomplishing organized labor's twin
goals of halting unilateral employer modifications of collectively bargained terms and conditions of employment during
reorganization proceedings, and reducing the perceived tendency of bankruptcy courts to reject collective bargaining
agreements without due regard for national labor policy.
The data confirm the general impression among commentators that applications to reject collective bargaining
agreements are granted more often than not.3 3 0 But contrary

to what many of them feared 3 3 1 bankruptcy courts are not
routinely approving such applications. Although the rejection rate-that is, the rate at which applications under section 1113(c) to reject collective bargaining agreements were
granted-was about fifty-eight percent,332 the denial-of-rejection rate was almost forty percent. 3 In absolute terms, only
seven more applications were granted than were denied:
330. See supra notes 14, 35.

331. See, e.g., White, supra note 15, at 1198.
332. See fig. 5.
333. Id.
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twenty-two, denied fifteen, and
bankruptcy courts granted
334
declined to rule on one.

These figures are more interesting when compared to the
335
fate of union contracts during the pre-section 1113 era.
The only significant empirical review of the rejection rate
before the enactment of the statute was conducted by Professor James White. 336 Professor White reviewed thirty-three
cases 33 7 reported between January 1, 1975 and mid-1984 in
which "proposals" 33 to reject collective bargaining agreements were made. He found that, whereas the employer won
an "outright victory" in nearly sixty-seven percent of those
3
In absocases, the union won in only twenty-four percent.
lute terms, almost three times as many proposals were
courts granted twentygranted as were denied: bankruptcy
3 40
two and denied only eight.

By one reckoning, then, it can be estimated that before
section 1113, about two-thirds of all requests to reject collec41 Citing these
tive bargaining agreements were granted.
334. In one decision-accounting for 2.6% of the sample-the bankruptcy
court declined to rule on the § 1113(c) application because the collective bargaining agreement had already expired. See In re Sullivan Motor Delivery, Inc.,
56 B.R. 28 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985). But see In re Chas. P. Young, Inc., 111 B.R.
410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (ruling on application even though contract had
expired).
335. See fig. 5.
336. White, supra note 14, at 1184-85 & n.49. But see also Joshua L.
Sheinkman, Note, Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements in Chapter 11
and the Probabilityof Strikes: Tipping the Balance of Equities, 15 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 513, 524 (1986-1987) (reporting that, between adoption of
the Code in 1978 and enactment of § 1113 in 1984, debtor-employers succeeded
in obtaining rejection in 22 of 35 cases); Statements on Rejection of Union Contracts in Bankruptcy Reorganization,1984, 1984 DAILY LAB.REP. (BNA) No. 70,
at F-9 (Apr. 11, 1984) (statement of Robert T. Thompson, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, reporting that debtors obtained rejection in 19 of 22 cases decided during the period 1982 to 1984).
337. Professor White surveyed the outcome as reported by the highest
court-whether bankruptcy, district, or appellate-to rule on the proposal in
each case. See White, supra note 15, at 1184 n.49.
338. This term was used by Professor White. White, supra note 14, at 1184.
Although in practice a "proposal" to reject under § 365(a), or old Act § 313(1),
probably accomplishes the same purpose as an "application" under § 1113(c),
the difference in terminology is noted here to account for possible variations in
the samples compared.
339. Id.
340. In the remainder, according to Professor White, the employer won some
type of victory tempered by remand from an appellate court for additional proceedings. Id.
341. See fig. 5.
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figures, Professor White characterized the bankruptcy courts'
disposal of these requests as "routine."3 42 He expressed
doubt that the enactment of section 1113 would make a critical difference to federal judges, whom he predicted "will con34 3
tinue routinely to reject collective bargaining agreements."
To confirm Professor White's figures, the study independently reviewed fifty-four reported bankruptcy court decisions in which the debtor filed an least one application to reject a collective bargaining agreement under the executory
contract provisions of either section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code or its predecessor, section 313(1) of the old Bankruptcy
Act, during the years 1975 to 1984. 3 4 4 The results were remarkably similar to those obtained by Professor White: the
rejection rate was nearly sixty-seven percent, while the denial-of-rejection rate was just under twenty-eight percent. In
absolute terms, more than twice as many applications were
granted as were denied: bankruptcy courts granted thirty-six,
denied fifteen, and declined to rule on three.3 45 Figure 5 compares the pre- and post-section 1113 rejection rates in more
detail.

342. White, supra note 14, at 1198.
343. Id.
344. See infra app. D.
345. In three decisions-accounting for 5.5% of the sample-the bankruptcy
court declined to rule on the application. See In re S.A. Mechanical, Inc., 51
B.R. 130 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985), aff'd, 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) T 11,974 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1986); In re St. Croix Hotel Corp., 18 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D.V.I. 1982); In
re Hers Apparel Indus., Case No. 74-B-831, mem. order (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2,
1974), aff'd, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3254 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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FIGURE 5
OUTCOMES OF APPLICATIONS TO REJECT COLLECTIVE
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In sum, the study shows that the rate of rejection has
declined about nine percentage points since the enactment of
the statute-from about sixty-seven percent during the period 1975-1984 to about fifty-eight percent during the period
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1984-1993.346 This is a substantial, if not radical, improvement in the prospects for the survival of collective bargaining
agreements in Chapter 11.
Three pieces of anecdotal evidence provide further support for the hypothesis. First, in at least seven of the twentytwo decisions granting rejection during the study period, the
bankruptcy judge nevertheless expressed sensitivity to the
union's position and reluctance to grant rejection absent the
parties having undertaken substantial negotiations. 4 7 In a
decision involving the much-publicized reorganization of the
New York Daily News, Judge Tina Brozman of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York wrote:
It is with sorrow that I issue this opinion today. The risk
that the Daily News will cease publishing shortly if Local
6's contract is not rejected is extremely high. That will
cause all 1,850 employees [including 167 affected bargaining unit employees] to lose their jobs ....

I had hoped

that the parties could see the wisdom [of] settling. And I
gave them that opportunity twice, once [during] the middle of the trial and then again at its close when I held off
ruling until after the weekend had passed. Unfortunately, they remain at impasse.348
Similarly, in a decision involving the reorganization of a
typographical firm struggling with the same union that
fought rejection in the Daily News decision, Judge Prudence
B. Abram, a member of the same court as Judge Brozman,
wrote:
346. See fig. 5.
347. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 146 B.R. 920, 922 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, New York Typographical Union No. 6
v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. 363,
373-74 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Walway Co., 69 B.R. 967, 975 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1987); In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 B.R. 403, 405 & n.2, 406
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 78 B.R. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989); In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52
B.R. 797, 802, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp., 50 B.R. 969, 984 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 52 B.R. 997 (W.D. Pa. 1985),
vacated and remanded, Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074 (1986); In re Carey Transp., Inc., 50 B.R. 203, 209 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d
82 (2d Cir. 1987).
348. Maxwell Newspapers, 146 B.R. at 922 (Brozman, J.). For a discussion of
the Daily News litigation, see Kirschner, et al., supra note 210, at 1524-33.
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The tragedy of this case is that despite the high stakes the
Debtor and the Union have been unable to negotiate a solution either before the trial started or thereafter. The
Debtor made it clear that it would close its doors if rejection were not permitted because of its inability to obtain
necessary modifications from the Union. The Union made
it clear that the workers would in all likelihood strike if
rejection were permitted, which strike alone could force
the Debtor to close permanently. In either case, the jobs
of the present 31 Union workers and 40 non-Union workers would be lost, with resulting hardships on themselves
and their families and possible losses to creditors, and the
shareholders will lose a business to which they have devoted the whole of their working lives. Reasonable people
faced with these stakes34 9should have been able to effect a
workable compromise.
Second, in at least twelve of the twenty decisions granting rejection, the union rather than the debtor effectively
opted out of the collective bargaining process made available
by the statute-by resisting the debtor's bargaining overtures, declining to offer at the section 1113(c) hearing any evidence rebutting the debtor's reasons for rejection, or failing
3 50 Although
even to oppose the section 1113(c) application.
349. Royal Composing Room, 62 B.R. at 405 & n.2, 406 (Abrams, J.).
350. See In re Alabama Symphony Ass'n, 155 B.R. 556, 576 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1993) (union refused to meet following debtor's transmittal of proposal); In re
Valley Steel Prods. Co., 142 B.R. 337, 338, 341 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) (union
"ignored" debtor's proposals and never requested additional negotiations or discussions); In re Blue Diamond Coal Co. (Blue Diamond H), 131 B.R. 633, 649
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991) (union did not employ accountant to review debtor's
financial data and was "intransigent" regarding contracting out proposals),
aff'd mem., 147 B.R. 720 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.), appeal docketed, No. 92-5747 (6th
Cir. 1992); In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. 363, 373 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1990) (all debtor's evidence as to necessity of labor cost reductions and willingness to negotiate was undisputed by union); In re Texas Sheet Metals, Inc., 90
B.R. 260, 270 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988) (despite its numerous requests to negotiate, debtor was successful in obtaining only two meetings with unions); In re
Sierra Steel Corp., 88 B.R. 337, 338-39 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (union neither
responded to three letters from debtor nor filed opposition to application); In re
Sol-Sieff Produce Co., 82 B.R. 787, 794 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (union official
sent letter refusing to negotiate); In re Amherst Sparkle Mkt., Inc., 75 B.R. 847,
851 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (union offered "no documentary or other evidence
to refute" debtor's "necessary" argument); New York Typographical Union No. 6
v. Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345, 408-409 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989) (union "stonewalled," thereby causing parties to
spend "almost ten times more time in court... than in post-petition prehearing
negotiations"); In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 802 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1985) (union offered no evidence to rebut debtor's showing as to necessity of
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the statute imposes a duty to bargain in good faith only on
the employer and not on union parties, it is not hard to understand why a bankruptcy judge would incline toward finding in favor of the debtor when a union's intransigence effec3 51
tively precludes bargaining.
Finally, in at least three of the fifteen decisions denying
rejection, the bankruptcy court ruled for the union even
though it appeared to believe that rejection was the better
course.3 5 2 In these decisions, the debtor's failure to comply
with Congress' statutory directives, rather than good business judgment, compelled such a result.
The one measure that, at first glance, seems to undermine the hypothesis is the rate at which interim relief from
collective bargaining agreements was granted under section
1113(e) . 53 The less frequently reported use of section
major reduction in labor costs); In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 51 B.R. 509
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1985), as noted on appeal, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n,
Local No. 9 v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 899 F.2d 887, 892 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990)
(union "stonewalled"); In re Carey Transp., Inc., 50 B.R. 203, 211 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985) (union "stonewalled" at meetings), aff'd, Truck Drivers Local
807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
351. [This does] not decide the proper consequences of [the union's] refusal to confer in good faith, but clearly some adverse consequence
should befall an intransigent party. At the very least, a union's lack of
participation should be considered when the court decides whether the
union had good cause to reject the proposal, and whether the balance of
equities favors rejection of the agreement. Other responses may also
be available to the bankruptcy court.
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 9 v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 899
F.2d 887, 892 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
352. See In re GCI, Inc., 131 B.R. 685, 697 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) ("[T]he
court's inability to find that the debtor conferred in good faith prevents it from
authorizing rejection . . .[even though] the need for modification is real and
undisputed."); In re George Cindrich Gen'l Contracting, Inc., 130 B.R. 20, 21
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) ("Were we granted authority to 'Do Justice, Sir,' then
clearly this contract would be temporarily modified."); accord In re Express
Freight Lines, Inc., 119 B.R. 1006, 1018 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990) ("The court's
finding that the debtor has not met its burden of proof for rejection. .. does not
mean that this court is convinced that the debtor can succeed in its reorganization. On the contrary, we are satisfied that it cannot. Therefore, we will order
that this case be converted to one under Chapter 7.") Id.
353. See infra app. C (listing § 1113(e) cases). The full text of § 1113(e)
provides:
If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues
in effect, and if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or
in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate, the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to implement interim
changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules provided by a collective bargaining agreement. Any hearing under this
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1113(e) made it somewhat difficult to generalize about trends
in applications for interim relief. Nevertheless, during the
study period, section 1113(e) applications were granted at the
rate of seventy percent and denied at the rate of twenty percent.3 54 In absolute terms, three-and-one-half times more ap-

plications were granted as were denied: bankruptcy courts
355
granted fourteen, denied four, and declined to rule on two.

Figure 6 describes the data in more detail.

paragraph shall be scheduled in accordance with the needs of the
trustee. The implementation of such interim changes shall not render
the application for rejection moot.
11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (1988).
354. See fig. 6.
355. Id.
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The available data suggest that bankruptcy courts routinely grant interim relief. In fact, the rate at which interim
relief was granted was slightly higher than the rate at which
straight rejection was granted before the enactment of sec-
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tion 1113.356 But three key differences between the two provisions of section 1113 explain this variance.
First, in order to secure interim relief under section
1113(e), a debtor does not have to climb the nine steps of
American Provision required to secure permanent relief
under section 1113(c). 57 Section 1113(e) permits relief under
either of two circumstances: "if essential to the continuation
of the business, or in order to avoid irreparabledamage to the
estate."358 The debtor is not required to submit a proposal to

the union, provide pertinent information, or engage in collective bargaining of any type or duration. Nor is the debtor required to show how the union, all creditors, and the debtor
are treated fairly and equitably, or that the balance of equities favors a grant of interim relief. Freed from having to undertake a longer-if not more arduous-journey,3 59 a debtor
seeking interim relief has an easier climb than one seeking
permanent relief.
Second, by definition, relief under section 1113(e) is less
drastic than relief under section 1113(c). The remedy under
the former is limited to "interim changes" in the collective
bargaining agreement, meaning a relatively short period of
time.3 60 But the remedy under the latter is "rejection" of the
entire contract, meaning performance of all obligationswhether the debtor's proposal sought modification of them or
not-is permanently excused and instead treated as a breach
giving rise to an unsecured claim. 61 As the provision allowing the more flexible remedy, section 1113(e) would naturally be more readily embraced by a bankruptcy judge faced
with a debtor's application for relief from his collectively bargained-for obligations. In four of the fourteen decisions
granting interim relief, the bankruptcy court specifically
356. Id.
357. See, e.g., In re Salt Creek Freightways, Inc. (Salt Creek 1), 46 B.R. 347,
350 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
358. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (1982) (emphasis added).
359. But see In re Wright Airlines, Inc., 44 B.R. 744, 745 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984) (alternative requirements of § 1113(e) impose "heavy burden" on
employer).
360. See, e.g., In re United Press Int'l, Inc., 134 B.R. 507, 514 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Any § 1113(e) relief must, by its nature, be temporary.").
361. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 532 (1984) ("[Tlhe
filing of the petition in bankruptcy means that the collective bargaining agreement is no longer immediately enforceable, and may never be enforceable
again.").
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pointed to the limited nature and duration of relief under section 1113(e) as mitigating the debtor's victory.362
Finally, section 1113(e) seems designed to give immediate, although temporary, relief to debtors who are in the most
desperate financial circumstances. The typical section
1113(e) application is filed concurrently with, or very soon after, the filing of the Chapter 11 petition, but before any application to reject outright is filed. By contrast, section 1113(c)
seems designed to give permanent relief, but only after the
debtor has expended the time and energy to engage the union
in a form of collective bargaining. Accordingly, the typical
section 1113(c) application is filed after the petition and well
after any application for interim relief. It would hardly be
surprising to learn that employers who claim to need interim
relief due to financial emergencies do not do so lightly, and
are more likely to persuade the bankruptcy courts of their
need for help than employers who need relief but can afford
to undertake the bargaining process that is a prelude to the
granting of the more common section 1113(c) application. Indeed, four of the fourteen decisions in which interim relief
the debtor faced quick liquidation absent
was granted showed
3 3
interim relief.
A look at reported decisions in which the debtor filed applications for both interim relief under section 1113(e) and
permanent rejection under section 1113(c) confirms this. If
bankruptcy judges are truly more inclined to grant section
1113(e) rather than section 1113(c) applications due to the
urgent nature of the former, then one would also expect a
grant of interim relief to predict a grant of permanent relief.
362. See In re United Press Int'l, Inc., 134 B.R. 507, 514, 515 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Evans Prods. Co., 55 B.R. 231, 234 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1985); In re Russell Transfer, Inc., 48 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985); In
re Salt Creek Freightways, Inc. (Salt Creek 1), 46 B.R. 347, 351 (Bankr. D. Wyo.
1985).
363. See, e.g., In re United Press Int'l, Inc., 134 B.R. 507, 509, 512 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Question: "[Wlill UPI's business collapse without the immediate relief requested?" Answer: "[W]e find that UPI has met the heavy burden
required under § 1113(e) for most of the relief requested."); In re Evans Prods.
Co., 55 B.R. 231, 233 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) ("[The present negative cash flow
cannot be accepted by a corporation in bankruptcy."); In re Russell Transfer,
Inc., 48 B.R. 241, (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985) ("The Debtor's uncontradicted evidence shows that the Debtor cannot continue absent modification."); In re Salt
Creek Freightways, Inc. (Salt Creek 1), 46 B.R. 347, 350 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985)
("[W]ithout the requested interim changes, the company will not be able to stay
in business longer than one (1) week.").
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One might also expect to find more decisions in which interim
relief was granted and permanent rejection was later denied
than decisions in which the opposite occurred. The data are
in accord. Of the ten decisions for which data were available
on both types of section 1113 application,364 bankruptcy
3 65
courts granted both interim and permanent relief in six,

66
and granted interim but denied permanent relief in three.
In only one reported decision did the bankruptcy court deny
interim relief but later grant permanent rejection. 67
The data for rates of rejection under section 1113(c) suggest that the statutes have improved the prospects for preserving union contracts in Chapter 11.368 No longer are collective bargaining agreements routinely rejected. 69 Until a
bankruptcy court has been satisfied that the debtor has at364. There were 12 reported decisions in which applications for both temporary relief under § 1113(e) and permanent rejection under § 1113(c) were filed.
See supra note 317. In 10 of the 12 decisions, the bankruptcy court ruled on
both applications; in two, it did not. See In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 146
B.R. 920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (declining to rule on interim relief but granting
permanent rejection), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, New York Typographical
Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Sullivan Motor Delivery,
56 B.R. 28 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985) (declining to rule on either application).
365. See In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., (Blue Diamond 1), 147 B.R. 720
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990), later proceeding, In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., Inc.
(Blue Diamond II), 131 B.R. 633 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991), aff'd mem., Civ. No.
3-91-0741 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 20), appeal docketed, No. 92-5747 (6th Cir., June 10,
1992); In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. 363 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In
re Big Sky Transp. Co., 104 B.R. 333 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989); In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 B.R. 403 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 78 B.R. 671
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989);
In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 51 B.R. 509 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985), related appeal, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 67 B.R. 114
(D. Colo. 1988), vacated and remanded,899 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Salt
Creek Freightways, Inc. (Salt Creek 1), 46 B.R. 347 (Bankr. D. Wyo.), laterproceeding, In re Salt Creek Freightways, Inc. (Salt Creek 1I) 47 B.R. 835 (Bankr.
D. Wyo. 1985).
366. See In re Sun Glo Coal Co., 144 B.R. 58 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992); In re
Chas. P. Young Co., 111 B.R. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988); In re Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc., Case No. S-85-01113, slip op. (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 24, 1986)
(Jones, J.), related appeal, Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, 78 B.R. 575 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987), appeal dismissed, 872
F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1989).
367. See In re Amherst Sparkle Mkt., Inc., 75 B.R. 847 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1987).
368. See fig. 5.
369. See supra text accompanying note 346.
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tempted to meet the requirements of section 1113(c), an application to reject likely will be denied.
2. Hypothesis #2: The Debtor's Conduct at the
Bargaining Table, Not the Merit of His
Arguments for Rejection, Determines the
Fate of a Section 1113 Application
Hypothesis #2 presented an opportunity to study the degree of influence the nine American Provision steps may have
on the decision to grant or deny rejection.
In general, the data do not confirm the hypothesis. 7 °
Were the hypothesis true, the procedural steps that a debtor
must climb to reach rejection under section 1113 (steps one,
two, five, six, and seven) would be more important than the
substantive ones (steps three, four, eight, and nine) in determining the fate of an application to reject. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. By virtually every measure, the substantive steps are relatively important to bankruptcy judges,
while the procedural steps are relatively unimportant.
This finding should come as a surprise to serious students of the institution of collective bargaining, which in its
quintessential American form eschews government supervision of bargaining outcomes in favor of bargaining process. If
nothing else, however, the data do confirm the unique impact
of section 1113, which alone among our labor laws appears to
embrace government supervision of bargaining product as
371
well as process.
Based on researchers' ratings of the relative importance
of each of the nine American Provision steps, the study calculated an average importance rating for each step. The substantive steps consistently received higher average importance ratings than the procedural ones. 2 In fact, only a
single procedural step-the "meet-and-confer" requirement of
step six-had a higher average importance rating than any
single substantive step.3 7 3 These findings were true whether
viewed from the perspective of the parties ("contested factors") or the overall perspective of the bankruptcy judge
370.
371.
372.
373.

See
See
See
See

figs. 7-8.
supra text accompanying notes 253-264.
fig. 8.
infra text accompanying notes 387-390.

1994] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN BANKRUPTCY 905
("overall factors")., 74 Figures 7 and 8 report these results in
more detail.
FIGURE

7

AVERAGE IMPORTANCE RATINGS OF
AMERICAN PRovisioN STEPS

Description

Step

Contested
Rating

Overall
Rating

1

Proposal

1.3

2.1

2

Complete information

1.9

2.4

3

Necessary

4.6

4.5

4

Fair and equitable

3.8

4.0

5

Necessary information

2.1

2.8

6

Meet and confer

2.0

3.6

7

Good faith

2.6

3.1

8

Good cause refusal

3.4

3.4

9

Balance equities

3.4

3.5

374. See fig. 7.
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8

AVERAGE IMPORTANCE RATINGS OF SUBSTANTIVE VS.
PROCEDURAL STEPS
Contested

Overall

Substantive
3,

4,

8,

9

3.8

3.8

2.0

2.8

1Procedural
1,

2,

5,

6,

7

Among steps whose satisfaction was contested by the
parties, the necessary requirement of step three was recorded
as having an average importance rating of 4.6-by a comfort-

able margin the highest rating registered by any step.375
When viewed from the overall viewpoint of the bankruptcy
judge, step three still recorded an average importance rating
376
of 4.5-once again, the highest rating for any step.
The relative importance of step three in the decisionmaking process persisted despite the outcome, whether rejection was eventually granted or denied. In decisions granting
rejection, step three registered average importance ratings of
4.6 (contested) and 4.4 (overall). In decisions denying rejection, step three once again registered 4.6 (contested) and now
4.6 (overall).
Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the idea shared
by so many commentators is correct: the single most important step that a debtor must climb to secure rejection under
section 1113(c) is establishing that his or her proposed modifications are "necessary" to permit reorganization. Or, stated
another way, in the average bankruptcy court decision re375. As rated on a five-point scale, where 1 denotes unimportant, 2 somewhat unimportant, 3 maybe/maybe not important, 4 somewhat important, and
5 important. Accordingly, any rating above 3 is more important than not; conversely, any rating below 3 is less important than not. See supra text accompa-

nying note 298.
376. See fig. 7.
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garding a section 1113(c) application, step three is the most
important of all the steps in the decision-making process.
The only other step appearing to exert a comparable degree of influence on decisions to grant or deny section 1113(c)
applications is the fair-and-equitable requirement of step
four.377 From the parties' perspective, step four recorded an
of 3.8, or slightly below the level of
average importance rating
378
"somewhat important."

But from the bankruptcy court's

overall perspective, step four rose to an average importance
rating of 4.0.3 79 Thus, steps three and four were the only
American Provision steps to rate at least "somewhat important" in the average decision to grant or deny a section
1113(c) application.
The good-cause refusal requirement of step eight and the
balance-of-the-equities requirement of step nine exerted moderate influence on decision-making. They showed steady rat38 °
ings from both the contested and overall perspectives.
Steps three and four each recorded a mean importance rating
of 3.4 by both measures, making them remarkable at least for
their consistency.3"'
So what became of the procedural steps that, according
to the hypothesis, should figure most prominently in the
bankruptcy judge's section 1113 calculus?
As Figure 8 shows, steps one, two, five, six, and seven
3 82
registered collective importance ratings under 3.0 -meaning that, in the average section 1113 decision, the requirements that the debtor make a proposal, provide certain information, and meet and confer in good faith with the union
were relatively unimportantin the decision to grant or deny
rejection. This held true whether viewed from the contested
or the overall perspective. 3
The only countervailing support for the hypothesis was
found in the performance of the meet-and-confer requirement
of step six. From the parties' perspective, step six registered
an average importance rating of just 2.0.384 But from the
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See fig. 8.
Id.
See fig. 7.
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bankruptcy judge's perspective, step six jumped to an average importance rating of 3.6 311-indicating
that in the overall picture, step six was slightly more important than not. In
fact, step six was the only procedural step to record an average importance rating
greater than 3.0 by either measure,
3 86
contested or overall.

Two pieces of anecdotal evidence provide further support
for the importance of step six, if not for the now-endangered
hypothesis, in the decision-making process. First, in at least
fourteen of the thirty-eight decisions studied, the bankruptcy
judge specifically discussed the importance of negotiations
and expressed her preference for a collectively bargained solution rather than a judicially imposed one. 8 v In the decision
involving the reorganization of the typographical firm discussed above, Judge Abram expressed it this way:
This court is powerless to impose contractual modifications on the parties, even if that were the equitable outcome. It can only permit rejection or not. After rejection,
a debtor must still bargain with the union. If the changes
this Debtor imposes after rejection are38unacceptable,
the
8
employees are free to resign or strike.
Second, in at least seven of the twenty-two decisions
granting rejection, the bankruptcy court urged the parties to
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. See In re Alabama Symphony Ass'n, 155 B.R. 556, 572 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1993); In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 146 B.R. 920, 922, 930 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992); In re Valley Steel Prods. Co., 142 B.R. 337, 342 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992);
In re Pierce Terminal Warehouse, Inc., 133 B.R. 639, 647 (Bankr. N.D. Ia.
1991); In re GCI, Inc., 131 B.R. 685, 687, 697 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991); In re
Express Freight Lines, Inc., 119 B.R. 1006, 1013 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990); In re
Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. 363, 373-74 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re
Walway Co., 69 B.R. 967, 973, 975 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 B.R. 403, 405 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 78 B.R. 671
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989);
In re Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc., Case No. S-85-01113, slip op. (Bankr. D.
Nev. June 9, 1986) (Jones, J.), as noted on appeal, Landmark Hotel & Casino,
Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, 78 B.R. 575, 579 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1987), appeal dismissed, 872 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Kentucky Truck
Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 801-02, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re WheelingPittsburgh Steel Corp., 50 B.R. 969, 984 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 52 B.R. 997
(W.D. Pa. 1985), vacated and remanded, Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v.
United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074 (1986); In re Cook United, Inc., 50 B.R. 561,
564, 565 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Fiber Glass Industries, Inc., 49 B.R.
202, 207-08 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985).
388. Royal Composing Room, 62 B.R. at 405.
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3 s9
continue bargaining, even after the debtor had prevailed.
In a decision involving the reorganization of a firm specializing in the sales, service, and leasing of trucks, Judge Merritt
Deitz of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Kentucky explained:
[O]ur decision in this matter does not mark an end but
rather a new phase in the negotiations between these parties. Although we have granted the debtor's motion to reject, our holding does not mean that the union and its
members are stripped of their bargaining power .... The
ultimate fate of the debtor's reorganization effort lies not
in this forum, but at the bargaining table. We cannot
compel, but we do encourage the union and the debtor to
continue their negotiations, for without a settlement of
of the debtor being forced
this labor conflict the likelihood 390
indeed.
real
very
is
to liquidate
Although the data in the aggregate do not support the

hypothesis, 391 they do show that the meet-and-confer require-

ment of step six exerts measurable influence on the decision
to grant or deny rejection.3

92

But procedural questions about

whether the debtor made a proposal to the union, supplied it
with complete and necessary information, or even conducted
negotiations in good faith seem relatively unimportant in the
section 1113(c) calculus of the bankruptcy judge in the typical
decision.
3. Hypothesis #3: The More BargainingThat Fails to
Produce a Settlement, the More Likely That
Rejection Will Be Granted
Hypothesis #3 presented the opportunity to study
whether the amount of time spent in negotiations influenced
the decision to grant or deny rejection.
The data confirm the hypothesis, but some qualifications
are in order. Under the best of circumstances it is difficult to
measure the amount of "bargaining." Should each bargaining
contact be counted? If so, should face-to-face meetings be dis389. See Garofalo'sFiner Foods, 117 B.R. at 373-74; In re Texas Sheet Metals, Inc., 90 B.R. 260, 274 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988); In re Sol-Sieff Produce Co.,
82 B.R. 787, 795 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); Walway, 69 B.R. at 975; Kentucky
Truck Sales, 52 B.R. at 806; Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 50 B.R. at 984; Salt
Creek 1I, 47 B.R. at 842.
390. Kentucky Truck Sales, 52 B.R. at 806 (Deitz, J.).
391. See fig. 7.
392. Id.
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tinguished from written communications or telephone calls?
Should duration be measured, and if so, in weeks, days, or
hours? And what about quality-should a bargaining session
at which the parties carefully make and support their arguments be distinguished from one in which the debtor places a
"take-it-or-leave-it" offer on the table, or the union counters
with a "stonewall" response?
The study avoided these hard questions by default, because in most cases such data were not available. Few reported decisions described each and every proposal, counterproposal, bargaining session, telephone call, facsimile transmission, or other communication between employer and
union. So the study improvised by using two measurement
tools: the number of bargaining sessions and the number of
days available for bargaining.3 9 3
(a) Number of BargainingSessions
Data about the number of actual bargaining sessions
were recorded for all but eight of the decisions studied. For
each decision, the number was calculated by counting the reported number of face-to-face meetings at which the parties
expected to engage in substantive negotiations prior to the
section 1113(c) hearing. Exchanges of correspondence, telephone calls, facsimile transmissions, and the like were not
counted.
Overall, the mean number of actual bargaining sessions
was 3.4.394 Of the nineteen decisions in which rejection was
granted and for which data were available, the mean number
But of the eleven decisions
of bargaining sessions was 3.8.
in which rejection was denied and for which data were available, the mean number of actual bargaining sessions dropped
to 2.2.396 Thus the data suggest that the fewer actual bargaining sessions, the more likely rejection will be denied.
This spread of only one-and-one-half bargaining sessions
between the grant or denial of rejection seemed narrow, so
the study explored other angles from which to analyze the
393. See infra app. A (question 18).
394. A form of mean rather than a straight average was calculated to control
for the extreme variations in some of the decisions. Each mean reported here
represents data from which the highest and lowest recorded numbers have been
excluded.
395. See fig. 9.
396. Id.
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data. The study tried to determine whether any particular
cutoff in the number of bargaining sessions could predict the
grant or denial of rejection. An arbitrary line was drawn at
three bargaining sessions, and the grant or denial of rejection
following three or more sessions was plotted on a graph. Figure 9 describes the frequency of grant or denial of rejection
following three or more bargaining sessions.
FIGURE 9
NUMBER OF REPORTED DECISIONS GRANTING (DENYING)
REJECTION AFTER (BEFORE) THREE ACTUAL
BARGAINING SESSIONS

Outcome of § 1113(c) Application

Granted
(19 Decisions)

Denied
(11 Decisions)

13

3

6

8

Al

0A
6

The data suggest a strong relationship between unsuccessful bargaining and the likelihood of rejection after three
or more bargaining sessions. Of the nineteen decisions in
which rejection was granted and for which data were available, thirteen involved three or more unsuccessful bargaining
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sessions.3 s ' By contrast, of the eleven decisions in which rejection was denied and for which data were available, just
three involved three or more such sessions. 39 8 The conclu-

sion: bankruptcy courts "reward" debtors who have engaged
in actual bargaining sessions that do not produce contract
settlements by granting their applications for rejection.
By NLRA standards, three seems to be a small number of
bargaining sessions from which to base a decision about the
propriety of the grant or denial of rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. 399 Nevertheless, the number seems to be
significant in the context of section 1113.
(b) Days Available for Bargaining
Data about the number of days available for bargaining
were recorded for thirty of the thirty-eight decisions studied.
These data represented opportunities to bargain, rather than
actual bargaining sessions. In each decision, the number was
calculated by counting the number of days after the date of
the debtor's first proposal to the union up to and including
the date on which the first hearing on the section 1113(c) application was held by the bankruptcy court.
The study assumed that data about opportunities for
bargaining meant something different than data about actual
bargaining sessions. Under the statute, a debtor may exercise considerable control over the collective bargaining timetable by virtue of when he chooses to file the section 1113
application and then attempts to schedule negotiations with
the union. A meet-and-confer session cannot take place unless both parties agree, but under the statute it is the debtor's
duty to move things along by asking for bargaining sessions.4 °° When time marches on without producing a settlement-irrespective of whether or not there is actual bargaining going on-it suggests that the debtor is falling down, at
the minimum, on his or her obligation to climb the meet-andconfer requirement of step six. Perhaps he or she is preoccupied with other estate matters, or is simply lazy, but it is
quite plausible that, the more days that go by without pro397. Id.
398. Id.
399. See, e.g., C. MoRms, supra note 262, at 691-99.
400. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113(b)(1)-(2) (1988).
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ducing a settlement, the less urgent the debtor's section 1113
application.
So the assumption of the study, at first glance counterintuitive, makes sense: the more available bargaining days
between the date of the debtor's first proposal and the date of
the first hearing held on it by the bankruptcy court, the less
likely that the section 1113 application will be granted.
In light of this assumption, the data regarding available
bargaining days also support the hypothesis.4 ° ' Overall, the
mean number of available bargaining days from first proposal to first hearing was 72.8 days, or a little over ten
weeks.40 2 Of the twenty decisions in which rejection was
granted and for which data were available, the mean number
of available bargaining days was 66.6.403 But of the ten decisions in which rejection was denied and for which data were
available, the mean number of available bargaining days actually rose by almost three weeks, to 86.8 days.40 4
Just how useful is information about the number of
available bargaining days? The study tried to determine
whether any particular cutoff in the days available for
bargaining could predict the grant or denial of rejection. Arbitrary lines were drawn at ten-day intervals up to and including one hundred days, and rejection rates were plotted
along those intervals on a graph.40 5 Figure 10 describes the
results.

401. Other than setting certain notice and hearing requirements for applications to reject, § 1113 does not require bargaining for any fixed period of time.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1113(d)(1)-(2) (1988). Although as many as six months may
elapse between the employer's first proposal and the first hearing date, the
statute, if adhered to strictly by an employer-debtor, can produce a result in as
few as 24 days. See In re United Press Int'l, Inc., 134 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991). For a discussion of the time lines in the statute, see supra note
260.
402. See fig. 10.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. The rejection rates plotted here reflect the frequency at which rejection
was granted when the number of available bargaining days equaled or exceeded
the cutoff (which was defined as the last day of each interval).
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FIGURE 10

LIKELIHOOD OF GRANT (DENIAL) OF REJECTION WHEN
NUMBER OF AVAILABLE BARGAINING DAYS PRODUCES
No SETTLEMENT
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The data suggest a very strong relationship between the
number of days available for bargaining in which no settlement is produced and the likelihood of rejection. As the
number of available bargaining days marches on, the rejection rate steadily and substantially declines. When at first
fewer days are available for bargaining, the rejection rate re-
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mains relatively high: ten or more days (sixty-seven percent),40 6 twenty or more days (sixty-three percent),40 7 and
thirty or more days (sixty percent).408 A shift seems to occur
between forty and fifty days: from forty or more available bargaining days, when chances for rejection are still more likely
than not (fifty-three percent),40 9 to fifty or more available
bargaining days, when chances for rejection drop to less
likely than not (forty percent). 410 The logical explanation

would seem to be the one offered by the assumption underlying the hypothesis given above: the more days that pass without settlement, the less urgent the debtor's application-and
the weaker the debtor's case for rejection.
V.

SOME CAVEATS, AN OBSERVATION, AND SOME CONCERNS

ABOUT How

"NECESSARY" BECAME THE MOTHER OF
REJECTION

A. Caveats
Any interpretation of the results as supporting or undermining each of the three hypotheses offered in Part IV must
be tempered by some concessions about the possible limitations of the data. Before offering observations about some of
the larger issues raised here, the study notes three major caveats regarding these limitations.

1. Representativeness of Sample
It is fair to ask whether the thirty-eight reported bankruptcy court decisions under section 1113(c) studied here are
a representative sample of the universe of all such decisions,
reported or not. Is the number of decisions a sufficient basis
for generalization? Is the sample a random slice of the whole
pie, or a skewed piece of the crust? After all, not even the
federal appellate courts report all of their decisions, irrespective of the subject matter. Indeed, as trial-level courts, the
bankruptcy courts might be expected to report fewer, if any,
decisions.

The response is based on anecdotal evidence, but that evidence is persuasive. Notwithstanding the impending tenth
406.
407.
408.
409.

See fig. 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.

410. Id.

916

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

anniversary of the statute, applications to reject collective
bargaining agreements appear to be so rare as compared to
the regular law-and-motion business of the bankruptcy
courts that decisions on section 1113(c) applications tend to
get published.4 1 ' Originally, the study proposed to track all
such applications-not merely the decisions on those applications-filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Central District of California, the nation's busiest bankruptcy
court located in the nation's busiest federal circuit.4 1 2 The
idea was to follow each application from filing to disposition,
whether ruled upon or settled, whether published or not.41 3
But after spending three months during the summer of 1992
examining voluminous records of Chapter 11 proceedings
maintained by the clerk of that court,41 4 researchers turned
up just one section 1113(c) application. 4 15 A conversation
with the chief judge of the bankruptcy court confirmed the
rarity of such applications.4 16
Moreover, the chief judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania advised that, despite his considerable experience as both a set41 7
tlement judge in the Wheeling-Pittsburgh reorganization

411. Gordon Bermant of the Federal Judicial Center, whose specialty is case
management in the federal courts, disagrees with this premise. He agrees,
however, that § 1113 decisions are more likely to be published than bankruptcy
court decisions in other areas. Telephone Interview by Christopher D. Cameron
with Gordon Bermant, Director of Planning and Technology, Federal Judicial
Center (July 7, 1992).
412. See Tom Furlong, Many Firms Don't Survive Filings for Bankruptcy,
L.A. Times, at A16 (Jan. 13, 1992).
413. See Memorandum from Chris Cameron to Interested Parties Regarding
Faculty Research Grant Project-Summer 1992 (Apr. 16, 1992) (on file with
author).
414. The author thanks Chief Judge Calvin Ashland, Clerk of the Court
Frank E. Goodroe, and Records Supervisor Sharnette Bradley, all of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, for their cheerful assistance.
415. See In re Good Stuff Food Co., Case No. LA 92-41584-WL (Bankr. C.D.
Cal.) (filed Aug. 20, 1992). No decision regarding this application has been
reported.
416. Interview with Calvin B. Ashland, Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Oct. 14,
1992).
417. See 50 B.R. 969 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 52 B.R. 997 (W.D. Pa. 1985),
vacated and remanded, Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
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and a scholar analyzing the statute,418 he could recall no
other section 1113(c) application being filed in his court.4 19
In fact, the number of reported decisions issued since the
statute became law as analyzed here (a total of forty-six, including thirty-eight section 1113(c) decisions, over the nineyear period 1984 to 1993)420 compares favorably with the

number of reported decisions issued before the statute as analyzed by Professor White (a total of thirty-three over the previous nine-year period 1975 to 1984)421 and the number of

prior decisions independently analyzed here (a total of fiftyfour during the nine-year period from 1975 to 1984).422

As a result, the study may indeed represent-if not constitute-the universe of section 1113(c) decision-making in
the bankruptcy courts, reported or not. At the least, the present study seems no less representative than prior ones.423
2. Subjectivity of Evaluations
There is a measure of subjectivity in any behavioral
study, and the present one is no exception. Although most of
the recorded data admitted little room for interpretation (e.g.,
the bankruptcy court either granted or denied rejection),
other data could be considered ambiguous. At least two elements of subjectivity require consideration: that of researchers' evaluations, and that of self-reports by bankruptcy
judges.
(a) Researchers'Evaluations
Among other things, the study's key analytical tool-the
calculation of average importance ratings for each of the nine
steps to rejection under American Provision-dependedheavily upon the opinions of the researchers who recorded those
ratings. Other persons given the same task today may well
disagree with those ratings. Can we have any confidence
that the ratings are reliable?
418. See Cosetti & Kirshenbaum, supra note 241, at 208 n.233. Chief Judge
Cosetti acted as settlement judge during the Wheeling-Pittsburgh case before
its appeal to the Third Circuit.
419. Letter from Christopher D. Cameron to Chief Judge Cosetti (July 7,
1992) (on file with author).
420. See supra text accompanying notes 332-334. See also fig. 5.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 336-342.
422. See supra text accompanying notes 344-345.
423. See supra text accompanying notes 332-343 (citing analyses of combined bankruptcy and appellate decisions).
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The response is that four elements of rigor attended the
recording of average importance ratings. First, at least two
researchers separately reviewed and recorded ratings for
each step as to each of the thirty-eight reported decisions. In
most cases, the first researcher was a student and the second
was the author. Usually the second researcher agreed with
the ratings recorded by the first; when the second researcher
disagreed, he or she would so indicate on the inventory sheet
and discuss the matter with the first researcher before recording a "final" rating.
Second, each researcher was instructed in accordance
with, and performed rating tasks under, the same set of
guidelines.424 Even if the ratings were somehow inaccurate,
at least every researcher made the same mistakes. Third, a
simple five-point scale was used to record the ratings.425
Rather than seeking to measure fine gradations of influence
among the nine steps to rejection, the study sought broad
generalizations: did the step lean toward unimportant or important, or did it sit somewhere in the middle? The five-point
scale left less room for discretion than a finer measurement
tool might have permitted. Thus, each researcher was required to consider carefully where, along a narrow range of
possibilities, to record observations and conclusions.
Finally, there is a certain rigor that attends the simple
exercise of closely reading one hundred separate bankruptcy
court decisions (counting both pre- and post-section 1113 decisions). After analyzing such a sample, most reasonable people would have a good feel, at the minimum, for what is important and what is not in the decision-making process.
Of course, whether researchers' subjective evaluations
are truly a problem is a question capable of resolution by resort to the ultimate scientific tool-more research. The study
can be duplicated by anyone with the time and energy to sift
through the reported decisions set forth in the appendices.
(b) Self-Reports by Bankruptcy Judges
By definition, depending on reported decisions for data
meant depending on the accuracy of bankruptcy judges' written observations and conclusions about the facts, law, and
parties' respective arguments regarding each. If bankruptcy
424. See supra note 298.
425. See supra text accompanying note 298.
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judges omitted, misunderstood, or embellished this information, that too would be reflected in the data recorded by the
researchers.
The short response is that legal scholarship has depended on judges' representations about case information, as
reported in published decisions, for centuries. For better or
worse, judges' self-reports are the main vehicle for conveying
the type of information sought by the study. If this information was somehow suspect-and there is no reason to think
that reported bankruptcy decisions are any more inaccurate
than any other type of reported decisions-then the work of
most scholars also is suspect.426
3. Strength of Conclusions
The limitations of the study suggested by the above caveats counsel restraint in making sweeping conclusions. Accordingly, the study holds that fewer collective bargaining
agreements are rejected now than before the enactment of
section 1113; that the substantive steps to rejection under
American Provision427 are more important in the decisionmaking calculus of bankruptcy judges than the procedural
ones; and that the more unsuccessful bargaining that occurs,
the more likely rejection will be granted. These are moderate
conclusions supported by empirical evidence. To overstate
them would be to stretch the tools available for conducting
the research beyond what we should reasonably expect.
B. An Observation: What "Necessary"Means
Mindful of the foregoing caveats, the study may now
profitably offer an important observation about the major
controversy that heretofore has attended the statute. The
circuits and the commentators have debated at length the
4 28 as it relates
meaning of the term "necessary" in step three

426. Ceitainly the case can be made for collecting data about decision-making through other vehicles. Like everyone else, judges filter information
through their own experiences and biases, and may omit or alter-intentionally
or unintentionally-information before publication. In the alternative, researchers could review the unreported portions of bankruptcy filings; send detailed questionnaires to attorneys, judges, and parties; or, in appropriate circumstances, directly observe the proceedings. Although these methods also
have their limits, not to mention additional costs, future research efforts might
profit from the added rigor of using as many other sources as possible.
427. In re American Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
428. See supra note 36 (citing commentary).
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to the debtor's proposed modifications to the collective bargaining agreement. They agree that the problem has two
dimensions. First, how necessary must the proposed modifications be-essential, or something less? And second, for
what must the proposed modifications be necessary-com42 9
plete rehabilitation of the debtor, or something less?

But the debaters disagree about how to answer these
questions. The arguments raised by each side in the debate
have received plenty of attention elsewhere and need not be
repeated here.43° Suffice it to say that, as to each question,
each position has significant merit, but that, given the lack of
meaningful legislative history,43 1 it is impossible to pick a
winner using the traditional methods of legal scholarship.
The study, however, tells us that, whatever its true
meaning, the necessary requirement of step three is the single most important factor in the bankruptcy judge's
calculus.432 So, in the average piece of litigation involving
section 1113(c), any litigant who fails to deal with the necessary question will be remiss. We might well ask, then,
whether the study offers any guidance in the inevitable
search for meaning in the term "necessary."
Indeed, the study does offer some guidance. Recall that
the fair-and-equitable requirement of step four 43 3 was the
only step besides step three to record average importance ratings in the neighborhood of 4.0-meaning, at the least,
"somewhat important." (Step three recorded ratings of 4.6
contested and 4.5 overall;434 step four recorded ratings of 3.8
contested and 4.0 overall. 43 5 ) Thus, the data suggest a new

hypothesis: finding that the debtor's proposal would treat all
creditors, the debtor, and all affected parties fairly and equitably under step four is the substantial equivalent of finding
that such proposal is "necessary" to permit reorganization
under step three.
429. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 88 (2d
Cir. 1987); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d
1074, 1088 (3d Cir. 1986).
430. See supra note 36.
431. See supra note 272.
432. See supra notes 375-376 and accompanying text.
433. See fig. 7.
434. Id.
435. Id.
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In other words, establishing an independent definition of
"necessary" may be superfluous. If the new hypothesis is
true, then "fair and equitable" means "necessary."

To test the new hypothesis, the study analyzed data relating to two separate outcomes: the relative importance of
steps three and four in decisions to grant rejection on the one
hand, and their relative importance in decisions to deny rejection on the other hand. For each outcome, the study compared the number of decisions in which step three recorded
an average importance rating of at least 4.0 to the number of
decisions in which step four recorded an average importance
rating of at least 4.0. Figure 11 describes the results.
FIGURE 11
CORRELATION OF AVERAGE IMPORTANCE RATINGS BETWEEN

STEPS

3 AND 4 By GRANT
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The data comparing importance ratings when the outcome was a grant of rejection demonstrate remarkably strong
support for the new hypothesis. Of the sixteen decisions in
which rejection was granted and for which data were available, fifteen recorded importance ratings of at least 4.0 for
both steps three and four.4 36 That is, in decisions in which
both steps were at least somewhat important to the outcome,
if the debtor had satisfactorily climbed step three, then
nearly ninety-four percent of the time he had also climbed
step four.4 3 7 The results were identical whether viewed from
the contested or overall perspective.4 38
The data comparing importance ratings when the outcome was a denial of rejection supported the new hypothesis,
but not as strongly. Of the nine decisions in which rejection
was denied and for which data were available, five recorded
contested importance ratings of at least 4.0 for both steps
three and four. 4 39 That is, in decisions in which steps three
and four were at least somewhat important to the outcome, if
the debtor had satisfactorily climbed step three, then just
over half the time-55.5 percent-he or she had also climbed
step four.4 4 ° Support for the new hypothesis picked up, however, when overall importance ratings were analyzed. Of the
ten decisions in which rejection was denied and for which
data were available, seven recorded overall importance ratings of at least 4.0 for both steps three and four.4 4 1 In other
words, in decisions in which the debtor had satisfactorily
scaled step three, seventy percent of the time he or she had
also scaled step four.4 4 2
The conclusion: steps three and four are so closely correlated in the bankruptcy judge's section 1113(c) calculus that
it makes sense to read "fair and equitable" as a fair substitute
for, if not a complete definition of, "necessary."
Of course, for litigants in a section 1113(c) contest, it is
reasonable to ask whether "fair and equitable" is any more
susceptible of definition than the elusive independent meaning of "necessary." The answer is yes. "Fair and equitable"
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.

See fig. 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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harkens back to the formulae of the Kevin Steel and REA Express panels, each of which held that the relative equities
should be carefully weighed before the bankruptcy court

grants rejection,443 presumably out of a concern for fairness
Steel 444
to all affected parties. Taking their cue from Kevin
and REA Express,445 bankruptcy courts became comfortable

with discussing the merits of applications to reject in terms of
fairness and equity for at least nine years before the "necessary" standard was inserted by section 1113.446
In Bildisco, the Supreme Court itself offered some guidelines about the meaning of fairness and equity in this context.447 While cautioning that the Bankruptcy Code "does not
authorize freewheeling consideration of every conceivable equity," the Court instructed:
Determining what would constitute a successful rehabilitation involves balancing the interests of the affected
parties-the debtor, the creditors, and employees. The

Bankruptcy Court must consider the likelihood and conse-

quences of liquidation for the debtor absent rejection, the

reduced value of the creditors' claims that would follow
from affirmance and the hardship that would impose on
them, and the impact of rejection on the employees. In
striking the balance, the Bankruptcy Court must consider
not only the degree of hardship faced by each party, but

also any qualitative differences between the types of hardship each may face.4 48
Since the enactment of section 1113(c), "fair and equita-

ble" has become an accepted term of art meaning similar
"burden-sharing." For example, in In re Indiana Grocery
Co.,449 the debtor, the operator of a chain of grocery stores in
Indiana and Illinois, sought rejection of a collective bargaining agreement with Local 550R of the United Food and Com45 0
mercial Workers International Union (UFCW).

Local

45
550R represented food clerks at four stores in the chain. '
As part of a comprehensive plan of reorganization, the debtor
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.

See supra notes 142, 156-157 and accompanying text.
519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (1988).
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
Id. at 527.
138 B.R. 40 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990).
Id. at 42.
Id.
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had already negotiated wage cuts for food clerks at other
stores in the chain represented by Local 917 of the UFCW;
now it wanted Local 550R to agree to a proposal calling for
across-the-board wage cuts of 16.5 percent.4 52 Local 550R
resisted. a 3
In granting rejection, the bankruptcy court focused attention on step four. The heart of the matter, it held, was
burden-sharing; the reorganization had created financial
stress that major creditors, management, and other affected
parties should share.454 The bankruptcy court recalled that
it had denied an earlier section 1113(c) application precisely
because the debtor had failed to demonstrate that its proposal attempted to allocate the burdens of reorganization fairly
among its constituent groups.4 55 Instead, employees represented by Local 550R seemed to be hauling the heaviest
load. 5 6 Now things were different. The debtor had negotiated a reduced collective bargaining agreement with Local
917, cut management positions, stopped paying executive bonuses, reduced the chief executive officer's salary while increasing his responsibilities, and obtained credit terms from
vendors and forbearance from its bank on the right to demand immediate payment.4 5 7 In light of these developments,
the bankruptcy court concluded that the debtor, the creditors,
and all affected parties were being treated fairly and equitably-and
that Local 550R ought to have accepted the 16.5%
8
cut.

45

In sum, parties to and bankruptcy courts presented with
section 1113(c) litigation may look to the fair-and-equitable
requirement of step four for guidance on how to evaluate the
necessary requirement of step three.
452. Id. at 44.
453. Id.
454. In re Indiana Grocery Co., 138 B.R. 40, 48 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990).
[Wihile it would probably be an unreasonable burden for a debtor to
have to get and prove burden sharing by every one of its creditors, a
debtor should show that major creditors who stand to benefit greatly
from successful reorganization and from concessions employees make
are bearing in some manner their fair share of the burden of
reorganization.
Id. at 48.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 48-49.
458. Id. at 50.
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C. Concerns
For two of the three major hypotheses tested by the
study, the data discussed above suggest that section 1113 is a
success. At the least, one might say that the statute has substantially achieved the twin goals that organized labor had
sought: halting unilateral rejections, and reducing the perceived tendency of bankruptcy judges to approve rejections.
Yet the study raises at least two causes for concern that
lawmakers would be well advised to address, perhaps in the
form of amendments to section 1113.
1. The Rejection Rate Is Still Too High
The rate at which applications to reject collective bargaining agreements are granted has dropped from about
sixty-seven percent before section 1113 was enacted to about
fifty-eight percent today. 459 This is a substantial, but not
dramatic, improvement. Is there any reason to believe that
the rate should be lower?
One might expect that, after nearly a decade of experience with the statute, the rejection rate would be closer to
fifty percent. After all, the substantive steps of the law are
replete with the language of even-handedness: "fair," "equitable" or "equities," and "balance." And the procedural steps reflect the language of diplomatic negotiations: "proposal," "information," "meet and confer," "good faith," "good cause." In
short, these are words of neutrality. The statute expresses a
policy preference for neither grants over denials nor denials
over grants. It favors neither debtors over unions nor unions
over debtors. On its face, then, the statute would seem to
predict something on the order of a fifty-fifty split, rather
than a fifty-eight-forty split, in the rates of rejection versus
denial.
If the foregoing is true, then why are significantly more
section 1113(c) applications still being rejected than denied?
Several possible reasons come to mind: bankruptcy judges
have a persistent, though now tempered, bias in favor of debtors over union creditors; the necessary requirement in step
three is a non-neutral element in the law that skews the results; or simply, debtors' cases as a group are more meritorious than unions' cases. Perhaps there are others. Whatever
459. See fig. 5.
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the cause, there is a need for further research to determine
why and what might be done to balance, as the statute would
seem to have it, the relative outcomes.
2. The Government Should Monitor the Process, Not
the Product, of Collective Bargainingin
Bankruptcy
As discussed above, section 1113 made one of the most
sweeping changes in the law governing private-sector labor
relations since the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947:460 placing the
federal government, in the guise of the bankruptcy courts, in
the role of monitoring the product as well as the process of
collective bargaining. 461 The substantive steps to rejection
under American Provision (steps three, four, eight, and nine)
effectively amended nearly fifty years of national labor policy,
under which the government stayed out of the role of arbitrator as to the relative merits of either the debtor's bargaining
proposals or the union's reasons for resisting them.
There are three disturbing things about this modification. First, in light of the absence of committee reports and
sparse legislative history, Congress never made any finding
to justify such a radical departure from national labor policy.
It may very well be, as the pre-section 1113 bankruptcy
courts reasoned, that the exigencies of reorganization required such a departure, but certainly Congress has never
said so. Consequently, neither the departure itself nor its
consequences for collective bargaining outside of bankruptcy
has ever been fully debated in a national forum. A venerable
and successful institution such as collective bargaining would
seem to deserve better treatment.
Second, giving the job of monitoring collective bargaining
to non-experts-federal bankruptcy judges-was not a particularly good idea. Many of them have all but said so themselves.46 2 As a group, bankruptcy judges do show enthusiasm
460. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988).
461. See supra text accompanying notes 254-257.
462. See, e.g., In re Alabama Symphony Ass'n, 155 B.R. 556, 572 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1993) ("This Court is not equipped to handle what would necessarily
be a tedious process of rewriting the [contract]."); In re Royal Composing Room,
Inc., 62 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The necessity for the Debtor's
proposal and the equitability of the sacrifice are matters which must be first
tested in the crucible of prehearing negotiations."), aff'd, 78 B.R. 671 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), aff'd, New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room,
Inc., 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1078 (1989); In re Ken-
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for examining the product of bargaining, such as the economic impact of the debtor's proposals and perceived reasonableness of the union's response to them. The comparatively
high importance they attach to the four substantive steps to
rejection under American Provision (steps three, four, eight,
and nine) bears this out. 4 63 But bankruptcy judges seem

neither able nor willing to involve themselves in the bargaining itself; they are unfamiliar with the fine points of the duty
to bargain as established in the NLRA and do not wish to
be.464 The problem with this attitude is that product is less
than half the picture. The remaining five procedural steps to
rejection (steps one, two, five, six, and seven) require them to
evaluate the scope and extent of the process 465-a task that,
under nonbankruptcy law, ordinarily belongs to the experts
at the NLRB.466
Finally, the case against adherence to traditional labor
policy, even during Chapter 11, has yet to be made. The
Bildisco majority pointed to the debtor's need for flexibility
without offering any empirical or anecdotal evidence as to
how or why requiring bargaining under sections 8(a)(5) and
8(d) would interfere with this need.467 But by nature, the
process of collective bargaining is quite flexible.468 In fact,
tucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) ("The ultimate
fate of the debtor's reorganization effort lies not in this forum, but at the bargaining table."); In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 50 B.R. 969, 984
(Bankr. W.D. Pa.) ("[T]his court, as a place for resolving a collective bargaining
dispute, is not the proper forum. The real decisions must be made at the bargaining table."), aff'd, 52 B.R. 997 (W.D. Pa. 1985), vacated and remanded,
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir.
1986). See also Cosetti & Kirshenbaum, supra note 241, at 226 ("Nor should
the courts allow the judicial process to be used as a substitute for bargaining.
The union and the debtor must focus on the economic realities of their situation, rather than the strength of their respective legal positions.").
463. See fig. 8.
464. See, e.g., In re Blue Diamond Coal Co. (Blue DiamondI), 131 B.R. 633,
648-49 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991) (holding bankruptcy courts have no authority
to adjudicate unfair labor practices, no matter how blatant), aff'd mem., Civ.
No. 3-91-0741 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 20), appeal docketed, No. 92-5747 (6th Cir. June
10, 1992); Steven Kropp, Collective Bargainingin Bankruptcy: Toward an Analytical Framework for Section 1113, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 697, 701 (1993)
("[Blankruptcy judges' unfamiliarity with the principle of collective bargaining
leads them to misapply § 1113.").
465. See supra text accompanying notes 253-257.
466. See supra text accompanying notes 263-264.
467. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 551-52 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
468. See id.
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several respected commentators have argued that, the exigencies of bankruptcy notwithstanding, a union creditor has
great incentive during reorganization proceedings to engage
in bargaining with the debtor to produce a mutually acceptable outcome.469 Section 1113, for all the good intentions behind it, may have tinkered too hastily with the very institution that ensures flexibility in relations between Chapter 11
debtors and their unionized employees.
VI.

CONCLUSION

With due deference to the caveats outlined above, the
study makes some important findings about how section
1113, after ten years, is working. In substantial measure, organized labor's twin goals of halting unilateral rejection of
collective bargaining agreements and reducing the perceived
tendency of bankruptcy judges to grant rejection have been
achieved. The study found that the rate of rejection has declined from about sixty-seven percent before section 1113 to
about fifty-eight percent today. 470 Bankruptcy courts are
more sensitive to labor's position during reorganization proceedings and require debtors to climb the nine steps of American Provision before granting rejection. 47 '
But this success is a qualified one in two respects. First,
the rate of rejection is still too high. Given the neutral language of the statute, the rate should be closer to fifty percent-about the same number of rejection applications
should be denied as are granted.472
Second, the study found that bankruptcy courts seem
conflicted about how closely they should examine the process,
as opposed to the product, of collective bargaining. On the
one hand, the study found that the more bargaining between
debtor and union that fails to produce a voluntary settlement,
the more likely that rejection will be granted.473 It makes
sense that the longer the parties engage in fruitless negotiations, the more likely the debtor will be "rewarded" with rejection for at least having made the effort to work things out.
469. See, e.g., Douglas Bordewieck & Vern Countryman, The Rejection of
Collective BargainingAgreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J.

293, 319 (1983); George, supra note 16, at 335; Gibson, supra note 259, at 342.
470. See supra text accompanying note 346. See also fig. 5.
471. See supra text accompanying notes 347-349.
472. See supra text accompanying note 459.
473. See supra text accompanying notes 397-398. See also figs. 8-9.
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On the other hand, the study found that the employer's conduct at the bargaining table is far less important in the bankruptcy judge's decision-making calculus than are the merits
of his arguments for rejection.474 Under the longstanding regime of the NLRA, the opposite has been true. 475 This find-

ing, the consequences of which Congress has yet to carefully
examine, is cause for great concern.
The study does offer some guidance to section 1113 litigants faced with the difficult task of defining "necessary," the
requirement of step 3 that is the single most important factor
in the decision-making process. For all intents and purposes,
"necessary" under step three means the same thing as "fair
and equitable" under step four.
In enacting section 1113, Congress made the most sweeping changes in national labor policy since 1947. It is less than
certain whether these changes have been for the better. Future research efforts should investigate this important
question.

474. See supra text accompanying notes 382-383. See also fig. 8.
475. See supra text accompanying notes 254-257.
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APPENDIX A
CAMERON LABOR/BANKRUPTCY PROJECT
FIRST REVISED CASE INVENTORY SHEET
A. General Information
1. Case name & 2. Docket #:
citation:

4. Judge:

6. Chapter 11 date:

5. Circuit area:

7. Has § 1113(c)
application been
filed?

3. Court:

8. § 1113(c) application.
a. Filing date:
c. Decision date:
b. Hearing date(s):
d. Rejection?

e. Opposition?
f. Comments:

9. Prior § 1113(c) application.
c. Decision date:
a. Filing date:
b. Hearing date(s):
d. Rejection?

e. Opposition?
f. Comments:

10. § 1113(e) interim application.
a. Filing date:
c. Decision date:
d. Granted?
b. Hearing date(s):
11. Appeal
a. Filed?
b. Court &
citation:

c. Outcome:
d. Judge

e. Comments?

12. Other relevant issues.
a. Priority?
c. Other
b. § 1114?
(describe):

B. American Provision Factors (13. Specifically mention?

14. Contested factors:
123456789

15. Overall factors:
123456789

1
2
3
4
5

_)

Importance
= unimportant
= somewhat unimportant
= maybe important
= somehwhat important
= important

Factors
= proposal
6 = meet & confer
= complete info 7 = good faith
= necessary
8 = good cause
refusal
= fair &
equitable
9 = balance equities
5 = necessary info

1
2
3
4
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C. Court Proceedings
16. ER Proposal(s).
c. Written?
a. Proposal
made?
b. #?
18.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Meet & confer.
# of sessions:
Of these, # before Chapter 11:
# days, 1st proposal to hrg:
Good faith by ER?
U refusal to meet & confer?

21. Fair/equitable treatment?
Explain:
23. Equities favored rejection?
Describe changes sought:

17. U responses(s).
a. Counter made?

c. Written?

b. #?
19. Information
a. Necessary info provided?
b. Most complete/reliable?
20. Necessary.
a. Standard essential or nonessential?
b. Standard met?
22. Good cause for U refusal?
Explain:
D. Other Information
24. Industry involved.
a. Type of industry:
b. Type of workers:

25. BK plan.
a. Filed?
b. Confirmed?
27.
a.
b.
c.
d.

Counsel
ER:
U:
CR cte:
Other:

Date:
Date:

26. Settlement.
a. Order on application entered?
b. If not, settled?
Explain:
28. Researcher's data
Date:
a. Analyzed by:
Date:
b. Reviewed by:
Observations:
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B

REPORTED BANKRUPTcY COURT DECISIONS UNDER

SECTION

1113(C) 1984-1993

Decisions Granting Rejection
In re Alabama Symphony Ass'n,
155 B.R. 556 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993).
In re Allied Delivery Sys. Co.,
49 B.R. 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
In re Amherst Sparkle Mkt., Inc.,
75 B.R. 847 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
In re AppleTree Mkts., Inc.,
155 B.R. 431 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (referring to unreported
bankruptcy court decision; reported district court decision provides significant data).
In re Big Sky Transp. Co.,
104 B.R. 333 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989) (granting application to "reject" contract for 180 days).
In re Blue Diamond Coal Co. (Blue Diamond I/),
131 B.R. 633 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991), affd mem., Civ.
No. 3-91-0741 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 20), appeal docketed,
No. 92-5747 (6th Cir. June 10, 1992).
In re Carey Transp., Inc.,
50 B.R. 203 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd mem. Case
No. -, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1986) (Owen, J.), aff'd,
Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816
F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.,
Case No. 2-85-00197, slip op. (Bankr. D. Conn. July 26,
1985) (Krechevsky, J.), affd, 55 B.R. 712 (D. Conn.
1985), rev'd, Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. UAW, 795
F.2d 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 947 (1986)
(referring to unreported bankruptcy court decision, but
significant data therein available from reported appellate decisions).
In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc.,
117 B.R. 363 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (extending interim
relief and granting permanent rejection as of date
certain unless parties mutually agreed to "snap-back"
provision).
In re Gatke Corp.,
Case No. 87-30308-RKR, slip op. (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
June 1988) (Rodibaugh, J.), affd, UAW v. Gatke Corp.,
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151 B.R. 211 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) (referring to
unreported bankruptcy court decision; reported district
court decision provides significant data).
In re Indiana Grocery Co.,
138 B.R. 40 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990).
In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc.,
52 B.R. 797 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
In re Royal Composing Room, Inc.,
62 B.R. 403 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 78 B.R. 671
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, New York Typographical Union
No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989).
In re Salt Creek Freightways, Inc. (Salt Creek 11),
47 B.R. 835 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
In re Sierra Steel Corp.,
Case No. 86-M-09653, slip op. (Bankr. D. Colo. Apr. 9)
(McGrath, J.), remanded, Colorado Iron Workers Pension Fund v. Sierra Steel Corp., 88 B.R. 314 (D. Colo.
1987), on remand, 88 B.R. 337 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
In re Sol-Sieff Produce Co.,
82 B.R. 787 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988).
In re Texas Sheet Metals, Inc.,
90 B.R. 260 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.,
146 B.R. 920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and remanded,
New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell
Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc.,
51 B.R. 509 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985), related appeal,
Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, Local
No. 9 v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 67 B.R. 114 (D. Colo.
1988), vacated, 899 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1990) (considering retroactivity of prior unreported decision granting
rejection; reported appellate decisions provide significant data).
In re Valley Steel Prods. Co.,
142 B.R. 337 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992).
In re Walway Co.,
69 B.R. 967 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.,
50 B.R. 969 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.), affd, 52 B.R. 997
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(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985), vacated and remanded, Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791
F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
Decisions Denying Rejection
re American Provision Co.,
44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
re Chas. P. Young Co.,
111 B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (granting rejection
even though contract had already expired).
re Cook United, Inc.,
50 B.R. 561 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (referring to
§ 1113(e), but treating application as one for rejection
under § 1113(c)).
re Fiber Glass Industries,
49 B.R. 202 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985).
re Express Freight Lines, Inc.,
119 B.R. 1006 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990).
re GCI, Inc.,
131 B.R. 685 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991).
re George Cindrich Gen'l Contracting, Inc.,
130 B.R. 20 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991).
re Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc.,
Case No. S-85-01113, slip op. (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 24,
1986) (Jones, J.), related appeal, Landmark Hotel &
Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas,
78 B.R. 575 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987), appeal dismissed,
872 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1989) (referring to unreported
bankruptcy court decision on § 1113(c) application;
reported appellate decisions on § 1113(e) application
provide significant data. A later § 1113(c) application
was granted.
re K & B Mounting, Inc.,
50 B.R. 460 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
re Pierce Terminal Warehouse, Inc.,
133 B.R. 639 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1991).
re Schauer Mfg. Corp.,
145 B.R. 32 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
re Sun Glo Coal Co.,
144 B.R. 58 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992).
re Unimet Corp.,
Case No. 685-00240, slip op. (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 6,
1985) (Williams, J.), related appeal, United Steelwork-
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ers v. Unimet Corp., 842 F.2d 879 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988) (referring to unreported
bankruptcy court decision; reported appellate decisions
provide significant data).
In re Valley Kitchens, Inc.,
52 B.R. 493 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
In re William P. Brogna & Co.,
64 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986).
Non-Decisions Regarding Rejection
In re Sullivan Motor Delivery,
56 B.R. 28 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985) (declining to rule on
application because contracts had already expired).
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APPENDIX C

REPORTED BANKRuPTcy COURT DECISIONS UNDER
SECTION

1113(E) 1984-1993

Decisions Granting Interim Relief
In re Big Sky Transp. Co.,
104 B.R. 333 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989) (granting application to "reject" contract for 180 days).
In re Blue Diamond Coal Co. (Blue Diamond I),
131 B.R. 633 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991) (referring to
unreported bankruptcy court decision; reported bankruptcy decision, disallowing unsecured claim for damages arising from grant of interim relief, provides
significant data).
In re Chas. P. Young Co.,
111 B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
In re D.O. & W. Coal Co.,
93 B.R. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988) (referring to
unreported bankruptcy court decisions granting application for interim relief and later application to modify
same, but denying separate application to modify
again; reported later decision, proceeding on contempt
motion for employer's non-compliance, provides significant data).
In re Evans Prods. Co.,
55 B.R. 231 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc.,
117 B.R. 363 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.,
Case No. 89-B-10448, slip op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14,
1990) (Lifland, J.), vacated, Shugrue v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, 139 B.R. 772 (1992) (referring to unreported
bankruptcy court decision; reported appellate decisions
provide significant data).
In re Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc.,
Case No. S-85-01113, slip op. (Bankr. D. Nev. June 9,
1986) (Jones, J.), affd, Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc.
v. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, 78 B.R. 575
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987), appeal dismissed, 872 F.2d 857
(9th Cir. 1989) (referring to unreported bankruptcy
court decision; reported appellate decisions provide
significant data).
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In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc.,
51 B.R. 509 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985), related appeal,
Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, Local
9 v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 67 B.R. 114 (D. Colo.
1988), vacated, 899 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1990) (considering retroactivity of prior unreported decision granting
rejection; reported appellate decisions provide significant data).
In re Royal Composing Room, Inc.,
62 B.R. 403 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 78 B.R. 671
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, New York Typographical Union
No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989) (referring
in passing to earlier grant of interim relief).
In re Russell Transfer, Inc.,
48 B.R. 241 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985).
In re Salt Creek Freightways (Salt Creek I),
46 B.R. 347 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
In re Sun Glo Coal Co.,
144 B.R. 58 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992).
In re United Press Int'l, Inc.,
134 B.R. 507 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Decisions Denying Interim Relief
In re Amherst Sparkle Mkt., Inc.,
75 B.R. 847 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
In re Beckley Coal Mining Co.,
81 B.R. 6 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987), rev'd, Beckley Coal
Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers, 98 B.R. 690
(Bankr. D. Del. 1988).
In re Cedar Rapids Meats, Inc.,
117 B.R. 448 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990).
In re Wright Air Lines, Inc.,
44 B.R. 744 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
Non-Decisions Regarding Interim Relief
In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.,
146 B.R. 920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), affd in part and rev'd
in part, New York Typographical Union No. 6 v.
Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 981 F.2d 85
(2d Cir. 1992).
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In re Sullivan Motor Delivery, Inc.
56 B.R. 28 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985) (declining to rule on
application because contracts had already expired).
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APPENDIX

D

REPORTED BANKRUPTCY COURT DECISIONS ON APPLICATIONS

TO REJECT UNDER BANKRUPTCY ACT SECTION 313(1) AND
BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 365(A) 1975-1984 *

Decisions Granting Rejection
In re Alan Wood Steel Co.,
449 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1978), appeal dismissed,
595 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1979).
In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc.,
B.R. No. 8-92871-H, oral op. (Bankr. E.D. Mich Mar.
31, 1979), appeal dismissed, Borman's, Inc. v. Allied
Supermarkets, Inc., 6 B.R. 968 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1980), affd per curiam, 706 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1983)
(referring to unreported bankruptcy court decision;
reported appellate decisions provide significant data).
In re Allied Technology, Inc.
8 B.R. 366 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
In re Ateco Equip., Inc.,
18 B.R. 915 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).
re
In Bildisco,
B.R. No. 80-01283, oral op. (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 15)
(Stark, J.), affd, Civ. No. 81-942, bench op. (D.N.J.

May 4, 1981) (Thompson, J.), vacated and remanded,

NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.
1982), affd, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
In re Bloss Glass Co.,
39 B.R. 694 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984).
In re Blue Ribbon Transp. Co.,
30 B.R. 783 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983) (granting rejection
conditioned on employer undertaking certain
performance).
In re Bohack Corp.,
Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 431 F. Supp.
646 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), related appeal, Truck Drivers
Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976)
* Including unreported decisions for which reported appeals or reported

related decisions provide significant data about bankruptcy court proceedings.
(Prior to 1979, most bankruptcy court decisions were unreported.) Also
including decisions issued on or after July 10, 1984, but for which petitions for
reorganization under chapter 11 or its predecessor, chapter XI, were filed before

such date. The study includes bankruptcy court decisions collected by Professor
James White, together with other decisions turned up by the study. See White,
supra note 15, at 1184-85 n.49.
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(referring to unreported bankruptcy court decision;
reported district court decision provides significant
data).
In re Brada Miller Freight Sys. Inc.,
16 B.R. 1002 (N.D. Ala. 1981), vacated, 702 F.2d 890
(11th Cir. 1983) (referring to unreported bankruptcy
court decision; reported appellate decisions provide
significant data).
In re Braniff Airways, Inc.,
25 B.R. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
In re Briggs Transp. Co.,
39 B.R. 343 (Bankr. D. Minn.), affd, Briggs Transp. Co.
v. Local 710, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 40 B.R. 972 (D.
Minn.), affd, 739 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 917 (1984).
In re Commercial Motor Freight, Inc.,
27 B.R. 293 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1980).
In re Concrete Pipe Mach. Co.,
28 B.R. 837 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983).
In re Continental Airlines Corp.,
38 B.R. 67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984), related proceeding,
57 B.R. 845 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (referring to
unreported bankruptcy court decisions; reported bankruptcy decisions provide significant data).
In re Figure Flattery, Inc.,
88 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (referring
to unreported bankruptcy court decision; reported district court decision provides significant data).
In re Flechtner Packing Co.,
63 B.R. 585 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (granting rejection
in context of employer's motion to dismiss union's
complaint to compel arbitration of grievances under
contract).
In re Gray Truck Line Co.,
34 B.R. 174 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983).
In re Handy Andy, Inc.,
109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3298 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982),
affd, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2657 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
In re Holabird Co.,
B.R. No. 83-00373, mem. order (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June
29, 1983) (Krasneiewski, J.), related proceeding, 86 B.R.
111 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (referring to unreported
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bankruptcy court decision; reported bankruptcy court
decision in related proceeding provides significant
data).
In re Hotel Circle, Inc.,
419 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Cal. 1976), affd, 613 F.2d 210
(9th Cir. 1980) (referring to unreported bankruptcy
court decision; reported appellate decisions provide
significant data).
In re Hoyt,
27 B.R. 13 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982) (granting rejection as
part of confirmation of Chapter 13 plan of
reorganization).
In re IML Freight, Inc.,
37 B.R. 556 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) laterproceeding,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. IML
Freight, Inc., 789 F.2d 1460 (10th Cir. 1986) (denying
motion to reject post-petition contracts; reported decisions provide significant data about unreported earlier
decision granting motion to reject pre-petition
contracts).
re
In J.R. Elkins, Inc.,
27 B.R. 862 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
In re Kevin Steel Prods., Inc.,
Case No. 73-B-909, slip op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1,
1974) (Schwartzberg, J.), rev'd, Shopmen's Local Union
No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 336
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
In re Kirkpatrick,
34 B.R. 767 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), related proceeding,
Kirkpatrick, 273 N.L.R.B. 1131 (1984) (referring to
unreported bankruptcy court decision; reported appellate and NLRB decisions provide significant data).
In re Midwest Emery Freight Sys., Inc.,
48 B.R. 566 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (referring to
unreported bankruptcy court decision; reported bankruptcy court decision in related proceeding provides
significant data).
In re Parrot Packing Co.,
42 B.R. 323 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983).
In re Price Chopper Supermarkets, Inc.,
19 B.R. 462 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
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In re Rath Packing Co.,
36 B.R. 979 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984).
In re Robinson Truck Line, Inc.,
47 B.R. 631 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1985) (approving
application to reject only health and welfare provisions
of contract).
In re Ryan Co.,
4 B.R. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 64 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1978).
In re Reserve Roofing of Florida, Inc.,
21 B.R. 96 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
In re Southern Elec. Co.,
23 B.R. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
In re Tucson Yellow Cab Co.,
21 B.R. 166 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982), vacated, Tucson
Yellow Cab Co. v. NLRB, 27 B.R. 621 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1983) (referring to prior unreported bankruptcy court
decision; reported appellate decisions provide significant data).
In re U.S. Truck Co.,
24 B.R. 853 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (granting application to reject on motion to reconsider prior denial).
In re Yellow Limousine Serv., Inc.,
22 B.R. 807 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
Decisions Denying Rejection
In re C. & W. Mining Co.,
3 B.R. L. Rep. (CCH) 69,792 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984).
In re Connecticut Celery Co.,
106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2847 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980).
In re Crozier Bros., Inc.,
52 B.R. 402 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
In re David A. Roscow, Inc.,
9 B.R. 190 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
In re DeLuca Distrib. Co.,
38 B.R. 588 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (finding, on
debtor's motion for declaratory relief, that debtor was
bound to terms of collective bargaining agreement
entered into during pending of Chapter 11).
In re Fitzgerel,
44 B.R. 628 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
In re IML Freight, Inc.,
37 B.R. 556 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (denying trustee's
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motion to reject because collective bargaining agreement was entered into post-petition).
re Louis F. Sammarco Elec. Co.,
109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3288 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982).
re Maverick Mining Corp.,
36 B.R. 837 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984).
re Miles Mach. Co.,
113 L.R.R.M. 3114 (BNA) (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982)
(denying debtor's motion to reconsider prior order
denying rejection).
re Schuld Mfg. Co.,
43 B.R. 535 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984).
re S.A. Mechanical, Inc.,
51 B.R. 130 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985), affd, 104 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 11,974 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986).
re Studio Eight Lighting, Inc.,
91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1976).
re Tinti Constr. Co.,
29 B.R. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983).
re Total Transp. Serv.,
37 B.R. 904 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
Non-Decisions Regarding Rejection

In re Gloria Mfg. Corp.,
734 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir.), later proceeding, Goodman v.
NLRB, 47 B.R. 370 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (referring to
unreported bankruptcy and district court decisions;
reported decisions provide significant data).
In re Hers Apparel Indus.,
88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3254 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (referring to
unreported bankruptcy court decision granting rejection
of individual employment contracts without reaching
question whether collective bargaining agreement providing for such individual contracts should also be
rejected; reported appellate decision provides significant data).
In re St. Croix Hotel Corp.,
18 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D.V.I. 1982) (recharacterizing
debtor's motion to reject collective bargaining agreement as motion to terminate collective bargaining
relationship,and denying same).

